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THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN ACTION* 
(for II. E. K.) 
by 
Morris Weitz 
The assumption that a necessar)' condition of our intelligible use of the con­
cept of human action is some set of definitive criteria which governs the correct 
employment of the concept has beeti effectively exposed and challenged by 
Harl, Hampshire, and Wittgenstein, among others. 1'he traditional doctrine, first 
intimated by Plato in the Eulhyphro, that in order to know or to stale what 
"human action" means, to have the concept of a human action, to be able to use 
this term correctly, we must assume that human action has a nature or essence-­
a definitive set of properties shared by all legitimate members of the class of 
human actions-is no longer sacrosanct Nor is it so clear that without a true 
definition or theory of human action we cannot render meaningful our attri­
bution of moral and legal predicate�. 
What sort of concept is the concept of human action? This, i t  seems to me, is 
the crucial issue in the whole debate now nourishing as a major industry in 
philosophy, more central than what counts as action as against movement or 
even Wittgenstein's problem in subtraction. ls the concept closed, i.e., governed 
by a definitive set of necessary and sufficient criteria which corresponds Lo a 
definitive set of necessary and sufficient properties? Or is it open, in Hart's 
sense of essentially disputable (no undebatable criterion), or Wittgenstein's sense 
of family 1·esemblance (a disjunctive set of non-necessary , non-sufficient 
conditions)'? It is my claim, which I shall argue for in this essay, lhal the concept 
of human action is open in the sense Lhal it has no necessary criteria, only 
sufficient criteria. Thus, "human action" differs radically from "contract," 
'·moral," and "game," the three paradigms offered by Hart, Hampshire, and 
Wittgenstein. If I am correct in my reading of the logical grammar of the 
concept of human action. it follows that phi losophical theories of human action 
are all of them unsuccessful attempr,s to lay down putatively necessary criteria 
for a concept whose use precludes such criteria. 
To establish the logic of the concept of human action as open in the sense I 
have specified we must. as we do with other concepts, turn from the individual 
theories to their disagreements. For it is in the dis.agreements among the theories 
that one finds the clue lo lhe specific kind of openness of the concept of human 
action. How can we explain, we musL ask, the range of disagreement about what 
is a human action? Why is there disagreement not only, for example, about the 
nature of intention or agency in human action bul about whether inlenlion or 
agency (or anything else) is necessary for or even relevant Lo human action? Can 
this disagreement be reduced to true-false claims about what intention or agency 
is or about whether nothing is an action without the presence of intention or 
agency? 
Philosophical theories of human action are purportedly true statements about 
'All  future publicalion ri)lhls r<'scrvcd by the author. 
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lhe definitive properties of such action. These theories conslilute real definilions 
and determine lhe corresponding criteria of our correct use of the concept. 
Hence, in asking whether human action is a closed concept we are in effecl 
asking: Is there a true theory or real dcfinilion o f  human action? M �  own \•iew. 
which J share wilh Hart. Hampshire, and Wiltgenstein, is I hat lhere is no such 
theory; lhere cannot be; and there need not be. But I "ish to go further than 
them to claim that the concept of human action has no necessary condition­
hence not even the makings of a Lheory-buL thaL iL does have surficien, con­
dilions; and that these are coterminous with the good reasons for i;omelhing 
being a human action. 
Charles Taylor, Richard Taylor, Roderick Chisholm, Abe Melden, Arthur 
Danto, Donald Davidson, among others, in lheir various writings, have attempted 
to slate certain necessary or necessary and sufficient properties of human 
actions. For them a lheory in the philosophical sense of a real definition is forth· 
corning. Have they succeeded in their attempts'? 
l begin with Charles Taylor's The Explanation of /Ju mun Behauiour ( 1964 ),1 
which formulates Lhe complete theory of act.ion and it.s Implications for experi­
mental psychology. In his book Taylor firsl distinguishes between the inanimate 
and the animate and, within the animate, between purpoSi\'e behavior as a�ainst. 
mere process or movement. This latter distinction, he claims, is both irreducibly 
ontological and conceptual. That. is, purposive behavior exemplifies a certain 
category o f  event. and order in the world which is amenable only lo a certain 
kind of teleological explanation. That there is such an order is a coherent and 
empirically testable doctrine; t.o which he adds that, because o f  the aviilable 
evidence in psychology, it is also a true doctrine. Mechanistic views such as 
behaviorism, that reduce this doctrine Lo conceptual absurdity and consequently 
the issue of teleology versus mechanism lo the non-empirical, Indeed lo the 
incoherent., rest. for him on inadequate causal explanations o f  purposive beha\rior. 
Rat.her than Leleology being incoherent., perhaps it is mechanism-which as a 
doctrine or science is inherently intentional-that is incoherent. Taylor implies 
that it is incoherent without, [ think. realizing that if It is, there cannot be any 
empirical issue between mechanism and teleology. ln his searching effort to 
establish Line intelligibility of teleology against the attack upon it. by mechanism, 
in order to render the issue between them empirical, he unfort.unalcly reverses 
the attack so that it becomes not at all clear throughout his argument that the 
issue between teleology and mechanism is empirical and not jusL a conceptual 
muddle. 
At any rate for Taylor buman actions are a Lype of purposive behavior. What, 
then, does he mean by purposive behavior? ll is an event which is observable and 
whose occurrence depends upon it.s being required for some goal. It is therefore 
a non-contingent, sufficient condition for that. goal. Hence to say oC an event. 
that. it is a piece of purposive behavior is to place that event in a system of events 
with Its self-imposed order which tends toward a goal. Jn purposive behavior, 
then, the behavior is a function not o f  an antecedent event or o f  a disposition 
but of a system of events including its environmenl. Thal Lhis behavior is such a 
funclion makes il teleological, requiring the formulation of teleological laws 
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about events non-contingently tending toward certain ends. 
Of immediate concern is Taylor's accounl of human action. lie begins wilh 
what. he calls the "slrong" sense of human action and lays down its set of 
definitive criteria. For anything to be such an action, it must be goal-directed, 
in the extended sense of emitting goal-directedness; it must be intended, hence 
caused by an agent or a person, who is free and is responsible for what he does; 
it must be intentional in the sense that it involves the idea of the goal desired; 
and, most important, the intention must be a non-contingenl, sufficient condi­
tion for the goal, bringing it about. 
Behavior that is neither goal-directed nor inlended, such as blinking, sneezing, 
or doodling, may be classified as action, he allows, but only in a loose sense. 
However, nothing that is not a piece of behavior can be an action for him. Nor, 
he claims, can behavior that results in a goal but is not intended count as an 
action. For example, i( I kill a man while in a tit, I kill him unintentionally 
hence, according to Tay lor, I did not act, therefore, I did not perform an 
action. My intemion to kill him must be a non-contingent, sufficient condition, 
required for the achievement of the goal, before my killing him counts as an 
action. 
This claim seems lo me mistaken, supported only by a stipulated. restrictive 
use of "action." For in this example it certainly accords wit.h oi:dinary usage lo 
say that because 1 killed him, I did perform an action-of killing-even though I 
am not. responsible, since I was having a fit when I did it.2 Perhaps I did nol act, 
for I was acted upon, but r did kill him: perform an action. "Action," at least 1 f  
we follow ordinary usage, does not entail "act," "intention," o r  "responsibility," 
Taylor offers another kind of behavior in which there is a goal with no 
intention: those cases in which one intends goal x but achieves goal z instead. 
Here we c:an still Lalk of actions, though qualified by terms such as "inadvertent­
ly," "unknowingly," "in ignorance," etc. For example, Socrates, it was said, 
intended to teach the youth but corrupted them instead. Here, i( we do not 
deny the corruption altogether (and the action of corruption), we can qualify it 
by some term of excuse, such as "unknowingly." However. in so doing, we 
qualify the intention, not the goal. 
Recognizing and accepting then these two exceptions-of non-intentional, 
non-intentional. non-purposive behavior (e.g., doodling) and of behavior with a 
differently intended goal (e.g .. Socrates corrupting rather than teaching the 
youth) as limited or as qualified actions-Taylor identifies human action with 
purposive behavior: behavior intentionally directed toward a goal. 
Intention, then for Taylor, is a necessary condition or property of human 
action. It is also central in that il is a sufficient condition of the goal. This 
means that intention is not an antecedent cause of the goal. Rather it is a non­
conlingent requirement, amenable only to teleological explanation. Thus, ''I did 
x because I intended to" is not analyzable into "Intending x was contingently 
followed by doing x.'· For "parl of what we mean by 'intending X' [is] that, 
in the absent-e of interfering factors, it is followed by doing X. I could not be 
said to intend X if, even with no obstacles or other countervailing factors, l 
still didn't do it. Thus my intention is not a causal antecedent o f  my behaviour" 
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(p. 33). 
Is " 'In lending x' entails 'Doing X, unless there are obstacles or other counter­
vailing factors' " a conceptual .  necessary, a priori trulh'? IL is not. "In lending to 
do x" does entail "Doing something"-otherwise we have no criteria for "intend­
ing"-but it does not entail "Doing x unless there are obstacles or other counter­
vailing factors." If I do not do x, where there are none of these factors, il does 
not follow lhat I did not mtend to do x in the way lhal it does follow, T think, 
that if I do nothing, I did not intend to do x. Moreover, if "l did x because 1 
intended lo" is a conceptual, non-contingent truth, then so is " I  did x because I 
had to." For it is conceptual! y impossible for me to have had Lo do x wilhout 
doing x. Mechanistic Determinism can therefore also serve as a paradigm of 
'l'aylor's teleological explanation! 
For Taylor then the concept or a human action is one that characterizes a 
class of purposive behavi or. The concept is governed by a set of necessary 
crileria: goal-directedness, intention, intention bringing about the goal, agency , 
responsibili Ly, and intentionalily. These reduce to the overall criterion of an 
intention, in a non-contingent way. bringing about a goal. Because these criteria 
are all there are, they function as necessary and sufficient-definitive-for some­
thing being a human action. 
That human action is necessarily purposive; that il is necessarily intentionally 
goal-directed; and that intentional behavior is irreducibly teleological, as 1 have 
suggested and as others have argued. are challengeable. Even our ordinary use of 
action concepts, hence of the concept of action, covers rases of action ·.vhich 
satisfy none of Taylor's criteria. Killing a man in a fiL is one example. So perhaps 
is falling in love, which is not a movement like making love, nor a state like being 
married, nor a condition like catching or having the measles. Falling in love, even 
if we have not read Proust, is at least sometimes, to some people, something one 
does. It is an act that issues in an action which need not be either intended or 
goal-directed. It may not be a strong case of action like getting married but it 
is not obviously a loose case or no case either. ll seems to me to be one of the 
clear cases. of which killing a man in a fiL is another, where intention or goal 
simply drops out. It may even be a case of a human action where there are not. 
statable criteria of action, as there are such criteria for falling i111 love, and there­
fore an action for which no good reasons are possible or to be expected. 
In his definition of the class of strong actions, I think Taylor provides at best 
only sufficient criteria for something being an action. That something is inten­
tional or goal-directed is a good reason for its being or being called an action. 
But that intention and goal-directedness are irreducibly teleological, or that 
Taylor's core concept of strong actions is coextensive with the class of clear 
cases of human actions, or that the class of clear cases coincides with Tay lor's 
strong actions plus the one exception of qualified action he allows, is, if not a 
stipulation. extremely questionable. 
For Richard Taylor, in his book, Action and Purpose (1966),3 the concept o r  
human action is indefinable. I t  cannot be defined because i t  cannot be analyzed. 
That is, no statement about a human action can be shown to be equivalent lo a 
statement about anything other lhan the action. Human action, however, can be 
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described and in I.his way be distinguished from everything else. Further, 
although indefinable, the concept of a human action is absolulely clear and 
basic, one that all of us possess as we reflect upon human experience. In the 
spirit of G. E. Moore, he says that all of us know what human action is-lhat we 
act and are not only acted upon-even though we are not able to say what it is or 
how we know that we act. Philosophical reflection-not introspection, observa­
tion, or speculation-reveals action as an ultimate category of human experience. 
Richard Taylor's basic dichotomy within the animate is that. of action versus 
process, not (as it is for Charles Taylor) of purposi\·e behavior versus movement. 
The former dichotomy and not. I.he latter is basic, he argues, because some acts 
can be purposeless, though no pur?osive behavitor can be without an act. 1 can, 
he points out, wiggle my finger with no purpose or goal: what I do may be 
pointless but I can and may do it; therefore it is an act. 
Action, act, activity-these seem to funclion as synonyms for R. Taylor-are 
uniquely human. Process, movement, event characterize man, the animals, and 
the inanimate. The main philosophical problem of action is to supply " . . . the 
difference between mere bodily motions and those that represent acts" (p. 89). 
What, then. is the difference between an act and a movement'? This is Taylor's 
fundamental question in his attempt to describe, if not to give an analysis of, 
human action. Both acts and movements are subject to causation, but to causa­
tion in a non-Humean sense that ultimately rests on the unanalyzable, yet 
absolutely clearly understood fact of one thing A making another thing B to 
occur. "A was the cause of B," applied to both acts and movements, cannot 
reduce to any set of statements which do not repeat the initial statement in 
another form, such as "A made B to happen by virtue of his power Lo do so." 
Thus the difference between act and mo\'ement does not lie in their different 
kinds of causation for they are both characterized by necessitation and power: 
what in traditional terms has been called "efficient causality." The difference 
between act and movement, then, .s that acts are events or movements that are 
caused-made to happen-by humrn beings and mo\·ements are e\•ents that are 
caused by other events. The concept of human agency does not derive from that. 
of event causality; rather, Taylor says, it is the other way round. 
That human actions involve human agency rather than causation among 
events, and that it is this agency that differentiates act from mo\'ement, Taylor 
purports to prove by the non-reducibility of statements about human agency to 
statements about events. Can lhe ·•can" in "I can move my finger" be inter­
preted as logically contingent (e.g., "A triangle can be acute"). causally con­
tingent (.e.g .. "Aloms can swerve from their path"), epistemically contingent 
(e.g., "This can be the restaurant we ate in last year"), or hypothetically 
possible (e.g., "This acid can dissol·•e a piece of zinc")-the four other kinds of 
possibilities expressed by "can"? U cannot, Taylor claims, for in saying "I can 
move my finger," I affirm that I have the power Lo move my finger whether I 
move it or not. IL is up lo me, within my power, whether I move it or no. IL is 
this notion, that all of llS understand though no one can say what iL is, I.hat 
" . . .  is never embodied in the meaning of 'can' as it is used with reference to 
physical things; for it never makes sense to say that it is up to a volume of acid 
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whether it dissolves a lum;:> of zinc . . . " (pp. 55-56; italics in o.riginal). 
Nor is the analysis of "1 can move my finger" in terms of a special kind of 
causal relationship among even Ls, namely, an in Lerna I event such as a volition, a 
desire, a wish, a choice, or an intention, and its external effecL, a plausible alter­
native to the irreducibility of human agency. And the reason it is not plausible, 
Taylor says, is that it postulates a non-existent entity: that is, there are no such 
events. Rather the criterion of the truth of any bypothetical of the form , "I can 
move my finger if 1 will, wa11t, intend, wish, or choose to," is the effect itself; 
i.e., the moving of the finger. Indeed, Taylor adds: "Our entire crilerion for 
saying what he wanled (or tried, or intended, or whatnot) to do, is what he in 
fact did" (p. 52; italics in original ) .  A want is not the cause of a doing, it is 
conceptually entailed by thai doing." I did x because 1 wanted to" may give a 
reason but it never gives a cause of our actions. 
If we turn from human ability lo human action, i.e., from "I can move my 
hand" to "I move my hand," the same radical distinction between aclion and 
event can be drawn. In a situation, for example, in which 1 make a mark with a 
pencil, it is true (1) that I move my hand; (2) that my hand moves; and (3) that 
my hand moves a pencil. (1) entails (2) but (2) does not entail (1); (3) entails 
(2) but (2) does not en I.ail ( 3); (1) involves the idea of an active being, (2) in­
volves only the idea of an event, change, or motion, and (3) involves a causal 
relation, without agency, between two things. But most important, (1), 
which describes an event as an act, includes an essential, irreducible reference to 
an active agent who is doing something. 
This reference to active agency. rooted in human ability, is, though in­
definable, absolutely essential in human action, which is also indefinable. Human 
acts or actions can be characlerized in other ways, e.g., they can be commanded, 
requested, or forbidden; they may involve change or absence or cessation of 
change; they need not be overt. But they must embody agent causality. Thus, 
to describe " . . .  anything as an act there must be an essential reference to an 
agent as lhe performer or author of that act, not merely in order to know whose 
act it is, but in order even to know that it is an act" (p. 109). 
Taylor's next point is !hat the doctrine of human agency-that. I am the cause 
of my actions and that I am not reducible to any series of evenLs-is entirely 
different from determinism or its denial. For both entail the distinction between 
act and event. Consider I.he schema: (1) e occurs; (2) Something makes e occur; 
(3) A does e; (4) Something makes A do e. Determinism and its denial are 
theses about (4) and in order to be affirmed or to be true entarn (3). Moreover, 
this schema, in which entailment proceeds from (4) to (l) but not Crom (1) Lo 
(4), illustrates once again Taylor's central claim about "the absolute difference 
between bodily motions which are and those which are not acts" (p. 124), since 
all four statements are about the same finger motion, yet different in their 
meanings, as their entailments demonstrate. (1) and (2) need not refer to acts. 
But (3) and (4) musl, with an essential reference to an agent as the cause of the 
act. 
Human action, thus for Taylor, is necessarily something done lhat is pro­
duced by an agent. All he allows this to mean is lhal a human being-not a self, 
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an ego, or a mind-makes somethi:lg happen because he has the power lo do so. 
Human action is man as efficient cause and not some event or set of events 
which are correlated with others. 
Human beings acl. For Taylor they are the causes of what they do. Sometimes 
they act in order lo do or to get something else: to achieve a cerlain goal or lo 
realize an aim or a purpose. llere action is purposive. And for him all purposive 
behavior is action, though not all action is purposive behavior. Only human 
beings. he says, act and are purpos·ve. In their goal-direcledness they initiate the 
direclion. l\lachines that are goal-directed are so merely in a derivati,·e sense in 
that they are designed by humans to aim at certain targets or goals; but machines 
do not act or initiate anything. Even so there arc no behavioral or observational 
criteria for distinguishing purposive from non-purposive behavior. This distinc­
tion, as in the case of causal agency versus passive movement, is made only by 
each of us as we reflect upon our actions that are done with some aim or goal 
in  view. 
Purpose, therefore, for R. Taylor, is another clear, ultimate category of 
human experience, understood by aJI, even though no one can say what it is or 
how we know il. Furthermore, the concept of purpose, which all of us are 
able to use to characterize purposive behavior, is also indefinable, incapable of 
further analysis. Along with agency, it is fundamental in any true philosophy of 
human nature. Although purposP is an indefinable concept, he adds, we can 
nevertheless attribule purposeful behavior to human beings as acting for the 
sake of certain goals. Hence it is Lo be conceived of as a means-end or teleological 
relation. Thus I act when l do something. 1 act purposively when l do something 
in order to get something else. 
This purposive behavior. he argues, also cannot be reduced to a causal 
relation among events, specifically. internal events or states, such as purposes. 
aims, or desires, together with certain beliefs about how to realize them and 
their effects. For, as he does with wants, choices, wishes, etc., in dealing with 
agent causality, he denies that there are such internal events. 
But he also argues here that the causal explanation of purposive behavior 
radically confuses reasons with causes. Purposive explanation of purposive be­
havior which, he insists, is explanation because it renders intelligible this behav­
ior by citing reasons-goals. aims, purposes-differs complete!� from causal ex­
planation. Statements such as "Jones went to the pantry lo get some salami" 
are teleological in that. they refer to ends and are true or false independently of 
there being these ends. On the other hand, statements such a'i "Jones fell 
because he slipped" are genuinely causal and are true or false dependently on 
there being these causes. 
Taylor's schema also implies the irreducibility of reasons to causes. If, for 
example, 1 do e in order to get f (Taylor's 3), it may or may not be true that 
something made me do e in order to get f (Taylor's 4). If (4) is true. a causal 
explanation is forthcoming; if (4) ,s false, it is not. But in either case, (4) dif­
fors from (3) and (3) does not entail (4). To affirm that (3) is a causal relation 
between events is lo comfuse (3) with (4) or, worse, to assume falsely that (3) 
entails (4 ). The reasons cited for (3), therefore, are not like the causes gh·en for 
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(4 ). Taylor llllls draws a fundamental, irredudble dislinction belwcrn reasons 
and causes in the explanation of human behavior. Causal explanallon of mo\'e· 
menls has its place, bm. it can accommodalE' neither the agency nor the 
purposnenes.c; of uniquely human acltons. 
Before we consider other theories of human action, perhaps a summny of 
agreements and disagreements in C. and R. Ta} lor would be helpful. First. i t  is 
important to validate my claim that R. Taylor, in spite or his thesis or Lhe un­
analyUible. indefinable ctaraeter of human action, offers a theory, or a. least 
the beginnings of a theory in the sense or a nec�ry property without wl1ich 
nothing is a human actior •. It is certainly true that he re1ects the analy1.ability of 
human action or of its corresponding concept. I fowever, the rl'asons he offers-­
that causal agt'ncy is central to both aclion and purposive behavior, that purpose 
also is central to the latter, that neither agency nor purpose can be further 
analyzed, and that criteria cannot be given for the understanding of agency and 
purpose-do not show t:iat human acllon has no distinguishable necessary 
property or that the concept has no recogni1.able criteria. lndet'd , i f  it did show 
this. Taylor would ha\·e no human action to describe. Whal he does show-if his 
thesis about human action is true-is that it is an absolute!) neces.c;ary propert} 
of all human aclions that. they are caused by a human being and that this agent 
causality is nol reducible lo event causalil}. Gh;en his thesis, he t·annot cieny 
that agent causality is a necessary feature of all actions, distinguishing them from 
mov<'ments; what he can and does deny is lhal this causalil� Is definable Con­
sequently, I take R. Taylor to affirm as his basic claim about human actiors that 
the} are necessarily caused by an agent and when these actions ar<' purposh•e, 
they po�ss two necessary properties, both unanalyzable and indclinable, 
namely.. agency and purpose. 
How. now, does his thesis compare with C. Taylor's? for the latter. tu man 
action is nee<.>ssarily more than being caused b� an agent. It must also have inten· 
lion as the factor that brings about a certain goal. Here, then, is one major dis· 
agreement: C. Taylor says that intention is a ne<.-essar� feature of human action; 
R. Taylor denies that it is, claiming that causal agency alone is necessary, al· 
though bolh are necessary for purposive behavior. For C. Taylor, no action can 
lack intention and purpose; for R. Taylor, some actions have neither. F1>r the 
second , killing a man intentionally is still an acLion, as is wiggling one's linger 
with no point whatever. For the first, neither is an action, because it lacks 
intention. 
Whal kind or disagreement is this? Is it ontological-about what is a common 
denominator of all members of the clas.<> of human actions? ls it conceplual­
about what is a necessary criterion of the concept of a human action? Or is it, as 
some philosophers maintain, a verbal wrangle about different slipulated uses of 
the term, "human action"? I f  it is the latter, C. and R. Taylor do not di;agree 
about. action; they simply differ in how they wish to use a word, lhe one 
choosing to r('strict it Lo purposive behavior, lhe other, to extPnd iL Lo all cases 
of human ogency1 regardles.5 of purpose. This is a basic question. I shall return co 
it when we have the full range or disagreement among philosophers about what 
is nt'cesc;af) in human action. Howe\'er, the particular disagreement between C. 
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and R. Taylor-whether there are or can be acts without intention or purpose-­
seems, al least on ils face, Lo be more about the correct criteria of the concept of 
a human action than it does about mere differences of criteria for two different 
concepts that unfortunately are denoted by the same word. 
There are other disagreements as well as agreements between C. and R. 
Taylor. Bolh distinguish sharply between action and movement, though C. 
Taylor allows that this cleavage applies lo some non-humans as well. For him, 
dogs and cals can act intentionally; for R. Taylor, they can neither act inten­
tionally nor act, only human beings can. Both insist on the irreducible, teleo­
logical character o f  human action, alt.hough R. Taylor confines the teleological 
lo one kind of human action-the purposive. Moreover, for C. Taylor, teleo­
logical behavior is observable (I see you shake hands just as I see your hands 
moving) and it is lo be interpreted as a non-contingent requirement for some 
goal. IL is also explicable in terms of teleological laws. Whereas for R. Taylor, 
it is not observable; rather teleological behavior is imputed lo what we do as a 
means to some end. We can cite reasons in explaining what we do, and in this 
sense explain our actions as purposeful; but we cannot formulate laws about 
non-contingent events. They differ consequently on the issue of mechanism 
versus teleology. For C. Taylor this issue revolves round the reducibility of non­
contingenl purposive behavior to contingently related movements; for R. Taylor 
the reduction of acts to events is logically impossible for, according Lo his 
schema, "I did event e" (3) is not equivalent Lo or entailed by "Evenl e 
occurred" or "Some event d made event e to occur" (1) and (2). lndeed, he 
transforms this issue of mechanism versus leleology into that of determinism 
versus libertarianism, both of which doctrines entail the cogency of action 
statements. Of course he also agrees wilh C. Taylor that a causal account, with­
out agency, of purposive behavior, is impossible; consequently, if the me<'hanism­
teleology issue is concei\·ed of as one about a competing causal account of "I did 
e" (3), both agree that mechanism is incoherent and that teleology is true, 
though they give entirely different reasons for their claims. 
There is one issue R. Taylor raises which is not discussed by C. Taylor bul is 
debated by other philosophers: that reasons for our purposive actions are never 
causes of these actions. We shall come to it presently. 
Finally, rin our initial summary, it should be noted once again that whatever is 
staled as a necessary condition or criterion for a human action-whether it 
really is necessary or not-must be able to serve as a condition or criterion. It is 
no good saying that intention, goal-directedness, or agency is necessary for 
human action unless we are told what it is. In this regard, C. Taylor does clarify 
his notion of intention; and whether we agree with him or not that it is 
necessary for human action. at least we know what he means by it. 
What about R. Taylor's notion of causal agency? He says that all of us 
know what it is, even though no or.e can say what. it is or how we know what it 
is: each of us just knows and that is �he end of the matter. 
A.s attractive as this claim may be that each of us is in this privileged epistemic 
situation, it is replete with the obvious yet enormous difficulties concerning the 
learning and the teaching of such a concept which, for Taylor, is both private 
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and has no behavioral. observational crileria. Unlike the concepts of desire, wish, 
want, choice, decision, 3nd intention that for Taylor denote external, not inter­
nal, occurrences, from which they derive their entire meanings, Taylor's concept 
of agency seems lo function as innately pri\•ate wilh no criteria al all. l f  this is 
so, it is notoriously difficult. perhaps as some philosophers argue impossible, for 
agency lo be a concept at al l . Agency of course may still be a property of human 
action, perhaps even necessar) . but this property canno1. serve as a cri·erion of 
the concept of human action if agency remains a concept with no cri�erion of 
its own. 
In "Freedom and Action,".i Chisholm lays bare what he designates the 
descriptive as against the im putative clement o f  the concept o f  act and action. 
Like C. and R. Taylor, he affirms that human agency is basic. Man is lhe imma· 
nent cause of his actions, not a transeunt cause which is an e\·ent that makes 
another event happen. lf, say. l move my hand, 1 acL, l do something-I move 
my hand. IBul in mo\fog my hand I also make something happen in my brain 
as well as in lhe surrounding air. In the way in which I do somelhin' when I 
move my hand l do not do anything to or with my brain or to or with lhe 
surrounding air. Whal l do when l move my hand besides move my hand is 
immanently cause a brain event which transeuntly causes my hand to move lhaL 
in lurn lranseuntly cause . .; lhe air particles to move. 
When I mo\e my hand I am the immanent cause or my hand's moving-of my 
action-as well as the immanent cause or a cerebral event. Chisholm sees no 
difficully here in his concept of an immanent cause lhat includes bolh agcnl­
aclion causality and agcnl-e\'enl causality. l11stead he concentrates on the 
difficulty of distinguishin� talk of events Lhat just happen and events lhat are 
caused either by an agent or by another event. Thus it is not the distinction 
between immanent and transeunt causalion thaL is suspect but that of causation 
versus mere occurrence. Once we grant the latter distinction, which of course is 
not restricted to the philosophy of human action, and which Chisholm says is 
unavoidable if we are to pen;ist in talking about causation in the world, 
" . . .  the only answer that one can give I to what dHferentiatcs these t\�O kinds 
of causation ] is this-LI at in lhe one case the agent was lhe cause of A's 
happening, and in the other case event B was the cnuse of A's happening" 
(p. 22). 
As unclear as the distinction between causation and mere occurrence is, 
Chisholm immediately adds, the concept of immanent causality is more clear 
lhan that of lranseunL causality. Indeed the taller is derived from the former. 
And the former is rooted in our experience of causal efficacy. " . . .  lL is only 
by understanding our own causal efficacy, as agents, Lhat we can grasp lhe 
concept of cause at all" (p. 1 1 ;  italics in original). But now, one ma} ask of 
Chisholm: if we are immediately acquainted with causaJ eflicacy, aren't we 
immediately acquainted with ourselves as immanent causes, in which case we do 
know whaL causation is'? Then we are eilher acquainted with mere happenings 
as distinct from causation or we are nol. I f  we are, Chisholm's difficulty about 
differentiating them vanishes; if we are not, it still vanishes, for now the di ffer­
ence lies in causation which we immediately experience and occurrence wh ich 
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we do not but infer instead. The new difficulty becomes that of distingujshing 
between immanenL causalily wilh which we are acquainLed and transeunL 
causality as against mere orcurrence, both of which are inferred. If our concept 
of cause rests on causal efficacy wP do not need the distinction between causa­
tion and mere happening to validate immanent. causality, al least in its primary 
form when I do A rather Lhan when l make B (e.g., a cerebral event) lo 
happen. Of course we do need the distinction to validate the concept of trans­
eunt causality since that concept presupposes it. 
Causal agency is one descrip�ive element of the concept of an act. This, I 
lake it, is Chisholm's claim tha� a necessary condition for something being an 
acl or action or for lhe concept of a human action is (exactly whaL it  is lo C. and 
R. Taylor) an essential reference to an agent or a human being as the cause o! 
what he does. As Chisholm puls il, "al least one of the events that is involved in 
any acl is caused, not by any other cvenl, but by lhe agent, by the man" (p. 29). 
The second descriplive element of the concept of an act is that iL is 
essentially Leleological: "Aclion involves endeavor or pwpose, one thing occur­
ring in order that some other thing may occur" (p. 29; italics in original). 
Like C. and R. Taylor. Chisholm rejects t.he reduction of teleological or 
purposive action lo aclion as lhe effect of antecedent desire and relevant betief 
aboul realizing that desire. And like C. Taylor but in major disagreement with 
R. Taylor, he denies that there can be an action without purpose since. for 
him, one cannot act al all without endeavor or purpose. The concept of act or 
action is necessarily intentional: to act is necessarily to endeavor to make 
happen. R. Taylor's ruslinction between "I raise my arm" and "I raise my arm 
in order to get your attention" remains but it is no longer that of action as 
against purposive action; rather it is of one kind of purposive action, namely, 
endeavoring to make my arm go up, as against anolher, namely, endeavoring to 
make my arm go up for the purpose of getting your attention. 
Having stated the lwo necessary descriptive elements of the concept of an 
act. Chisholm defines the further descriptive concepts of (1) w1dertaking or 
endeavoring to make a certain thing happen, (2) undertaking to make something 
happen for the purpose of making some other thing happen, and (3) a successful 
intentional action, each in terms of the undefined locution indicating thal the 
agent is a cause and thaL the action is purposive or teleological. This is the 
locution: 
There is a state of affairs A and a state of affairs B, such that, at time t, he 
makes B happen in the endeavor to make A happen. 
Or more briefly: 
He makes B happen in the endeavor to make A happen. 
Or, in symbolic notation: 
(Ea) (Eb) M l  (b, a). 
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ln this loculion, ·•making happen" is a transiUve, asy mmetnc:al relation� Lhe 
stales or affairs referred Le> may be unchanges as well as changes and Lhey may be 
complex; and lhc subject term of "makes happen" may designate a slale of 
affain. or a person. 
If I raise my arm. Chisholm says, •·make happen" applies Lo my arm going up, 
certain anLecedent cvenls inside m� body, and certain subsequent external 
events, such as Lhe movement of air partides. 
''Jn the endeavor lo make A happen" is intentional as well ac; purposhe. Thal 
is, one can endeavor to make A happen withoul thereby acLually making A 
happen. Thus we cannot. infer "lie made something happen in the endeavor to 
make B happen" from "Jle made something happen in the endeavor to make J\ 
happen and he did thereby make A happen" and "/\ is the same concrele event 
as B;" and if one makes something B happen in the endeavor to make something 
A happen, he can know immediately or directly that he is making something 
happen in lhe endeavor Lo make I\ happen, allhough he may nol know lhal he 
is making B happen even if A =  13. 
Action, thus, fo1· Chisltolm is describable in terms of making lhings happen in 
the endeavor lo make olher things happen-his undefined locution. When J 
raise my arm, then. l make somelhing happen in the endea¥or lo make my arm 
go up. 1 do not make somelhing happen in Lhe endeavor lo raise my arm. To 
act is to endeavor to make happen, noL to endeavor to act.. 
What, now, is endeavoring or undertaking Lo make a certain thing happen'? 
How can this descriptive concept be defined in terms of (Ea) (Eb) M i (b,a)? 
Lel "U l a" symboliz<' "Ile undertakes al l lo make A happen." Then we have as: 
Definition 1 :  U l a - Of. (Eb) M I (b.a). 
From this definition it  follows that the agent. in undertaking to make event A 
happen, does make B happen; he knows that he undertakes to make A happen, 
though he may not knm.\ what B is or whether he is succeeding in making A 
happen; and it may be that he is not succeeding in making A happen. Moreo,·er, 
"undertaking" as defined does not imply contract. or commitment, exertion or 
effort, or trial and error. Like other intentional concepts, such as approval or 
desire. "undertaking" may lake a conjunctive stale of affairs as an object wilh­
oul thereby taking each of ils conjuncts as objects. 'T'hus a pian1sl who under­
takes to play a sonata undertakes to play the entire sonata as well as lhe first 
measure withoul then undertaking to play the last measure. The sonata has con­
stituent measures, A, B, C, and . . .  N; the pianist undertakes to piny the whole 
conjunction, including the first of lhc conjuncls, A, without thereby under­
taking the others . 
.. Undertaking lo make something B happen for the purpose or makine some­
thing A happen"-Chisholm's second concepl im·olved ja describing actions-­
can now be defined. Lel "P t (b,a}" symbolize "Ile undertakes at l to make B 
happen for the purpose of making A happen" and "bCa" symboli:t.c "B makes A 
happen!' Then: 
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Definition 2:  P l (b,a) "" Df. U l (a & b & bCa). 
According to this definition, we may describe someone as undertaking to 
make something B happen for Uw purpose of making something A happen 
without thereby implying either that he makes A happen or Lhal he makes B 
happen. IL also rules out as cases of this second kind of acLion situations in 
which an agent simply undertakes to make B make A happen. Th us to satisfy the 
definiLion, Lhe agent musl underlake at t. Lo make B happen, to make A happen, 
and lo make B make A happen. 
Chisholm's third concept-"a completely successful undertaking"- can be 
defined as follows. Let "I l a" symbolize "Ile made A happen in the way in 
which, al t, he inLended." 
Definition 3: l t a - Df. M L  (a,a) & (c) [P L {c,a) - )1 t (c.c) 1 -
This definition satisfies the condition that the agent makes happen all of 
those things which, al t, he undertook for the purpose of making A happen. 
Consequently it. rules out the extreme cases of inadvertent success or happy 
failure-symbolizable as ·'M l (a,a)"-which means that the definition applies to 
the whole class of cases in which the agent. makes, at L, A happen in the endeavor 
to make A happen, but does not apply Lo those cases in which the agenl makes, 
at t ,  all lhe things he endeavored to make happen for Lhe purpose of making A 
happen. 'J'hal is, Lhe definition rules out, for example, lhe case of an assassin 
who inadvertently runs over his intended \'iclim-an inadvertent success, as well 
as lhe case of an a�ssin whose escaping victim is killed by an unexpected 
stroke of lightning-a happy failure; since in both cases the assassin may have 
undertaken without success, say, Lo shoot his victim. 
Chisholm sels out to define the descriptive element of the concept of an act 
or action. He does this in terms of his undefined locution about an agent making 
one thing happen in order to make another thing happen. Thus agency and 
purposiveness, whether themselves undefined or indefinable or neither, function 
as necessary conditions of t.he concept of action according to Chisholm. Nothing 
therefore can be a human action unless il is caused by an agent who endeavors Lo 
make something happen. Aclions include an agent as immanent cause; at least 
one e\'enl, made to happen by the agent; and the intentional element thal the 
agent made the event to happen in order to make another evenl happen. This 
means lhen Lhat nothing can be an action which does not satisfy Chisholm's 
first definition: lhe agent makes B happen by undertaking al t to make A 
happen. Jn the way in which something can be an action without lhe agent 
undertaking to make something happen for the purpose of making some olher 
thing happen (Definition 2) or wi�hout the agent being completely successful in 
his undertaking (Definition 3), nothing can be an action without undertaking to 
make a certain thing happen ( DeliniLion 1). lf  this is correct, lhen for Chisholm 
the concept of an acl or an action contains al least one defined element as well 
as two undefined elements. 
Well, now. is it true, as Chisholm claims, thal every human action includes al 
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least one evenl 01· stale of affairs B that is made to happen by an agen t who 
makes B happen in order to make evenl or stale of affairs A happen? I f  we �ranL 
the intelligibility of his concept.s of agency as immanent cause and or making 
happen, Chisholm's thesis l think does cover certain unexcepL1onable examples 
of Lhe class or human actions. There are indeed many things that we do which 
include as their constituents things that we make happen in order that other 
things will happen. ln so far as there are good reasons for some things being 
human actions or being called "human actions," Chisholm pmvides at least one 
good reason, and thereby one sufficient condition of the concept of a human 
action. But has he also discovered a necessary condition-a common denomina­
tor of all human actions'! Are there, can there be, human adions without agency, 
causation, or intcnlionalily? 
R. Taylor, we remember, claims thal some human actions are not intentional. 
When I move my hand 1 make it happen that my hand movf>s but I do not do 
something else in the endeavor to move my hand. or course lots or things may 
happen or may be made Lo happen but I do not make them happen. 
Other philosophers go furLher: Some acts o r  actions, they say, are caused. 
They are caused by me. But "l am the cause of my act or action" neither is 
equiratent to nor entails "l make B happen in order lo make A happen," si11ce 
the first may be lrue and the second false. If, for example, I unintentionally kill 
a man, I cause him lo die. In Chisholm's terms, I make happen his death. But. is 
my unintentionally killing a man the same as or does il even entail thal I made 
happen, say, shooling hi:n in his heart (B), in order to make happen ihis 
death (A)? 1 cannot kill :iim without making something happen. But what I 
make happen-eithl:lr the shooting or his death-need not happen in order that 
something else happens. 
Finally, there are some acts ("deeds" Chisholm calls Lhem) in which the agent, 
some philosophers point out, does nothing. Or. perhaps more cautiously. I.he 
agent neither makes B happen in order Lo make A happen nor does he make B 
happen in order Lo prevent A from happening. l f  my walk is iced, I do nothing 
Lo clear il, and the postman slips and breaks his leg on my walk, I break the law, 
and r may even be said to have caused the postman lo fall and break his leg. 
Now, whelher I did something or did not, J performed an action-of breaking 
the law. How odd il sounds to say that I broke Lhe law by making some e\.ent B 
(which event?) happen in order to make another event A (which event?) happen. 
Whate\1er actions are, there are in many cases certain redescriptions of E.-verlti:; 
that function as action reports for which the language of making B happen in 
order to make A happen is very strained indeed. Chisholm's concept of action 
consequen lly plays an im portant role in the description of some actions; bui. it 
has little if any role lo plai) in the redescri ption of all action. 
rn his essay, "Freedom and Action," Chisholm says that his third definilio11-
of a successful undertaking-applies to what A. Danto calls "basic actions." 
This cannot be correct since for Danto, if there are actions, there musl be basic 
actions; whereas for Chisholm, if there are actions, there need not be successful 
undertakings. In Oanto's format, basic action is essential for all actions in 
exactly the same transiti\le, asymmetrical way that an agent making B happen in 
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order to make A happen is essential for all actions according to Chisholm. In ract 
Chisholm, it seems Lo me. must reject Danto's concept of a basic action since the 
latter is defined as an agent simply performing an action, e.g., moving his arm, 
without any teleological intenl. 'l'o introduce teleological intent is Lo move from 
basic action to action for Oanto: from Uanlo's (4) Lo his (1) in his schema of (1) 
X'{' 's by</- ing; (2) X'f 's because y makes him do so; (3) X'f 's because of a 
nervous disorder; and (4) X (simply)<f's. Danto's basic action, thus. is more like 
R. 'raylor's (3) "I move m y  finger'' than it is like Chisholm's "l raise my arm" as 
entailing '·J endeavor lo make my arm go up (A) by making something else (B) 
happen." In rejecting R. Taylor':; distinction between action and purposive 
action. Chisholm denies as well Oanto's notion of a basic action, i.e., an agent­
caused, non-teleological action. 
Here, then, is another important disagreement; if there are basic actions and 
Danlo says that there are, are they necessarily teleological as well as agenl­
caused? Oanlo and R. Taylor claim that basic actions (Taylor calls them 
"simple") are not teleological. Chisholm and C. Taylor agree that there are basic 
actions in Danto's sense of events caused by an agent without the agent having 
to do anything else Lo cause them; but they insist that they are intentional. 
This issue whether there are basic actions and what they are is o f  course Lied 
to the whole problem of what is a human action; l shall consider both in their 
proper place. Just here, however, Danto's essay, "Basic Actions."5 is relevanl 
because it is yet another atLempt to secure Lhe concept of human action in agent 
causality. For Danto, an agent performs an action if he makes something happen. 
And there are lwo ways that he can make something happen; by first making 
something else happen; or by makin� something happen without first making 
anything else happen. Both a1·e actions. However, the lat.ter is basic in lhat the 
former entails lhe latter but the latter does not entail the former. "Basic 
action," thus, refers to what we can and do perform without having to perform 
anything else as lhe cause of what we do. �1y moving my foot. but not my foot 
moving, is a basic action; m y  kicking a stone or the stone moving is not. Never­
theless I cannot kick the stone without moving my foot. Kicking the stone (or 
moving it) is the effect of moving my foot. My moving foot causes the stone lo 
move as an effect of the cause. When I move my foot in order lo kick the stone, 
J do not do anything in order to move my foot, I just move it. 
A basic action, then, is not uncaused. Rather it is caused-by the agent. ln 
Oanto's schematism, a basic action is an event (e) that is caused by an individ­
ual (M) where e is not the effect of an antecedent event as its cause but the 
effect of an agent. 
Danlo supports his claim that there are basic actions by a direct appeal to ex­
perience: to our human repertoire of these actions. All o f  us, for example, if we 
are normal, know how to and how we move our arms. What we cannot do is to 
Pxplain how it is done, for there is nothing in the explana11s which is nol already 
present in the explica11dum. Basic adions are simply given. 
Danto also supports his claim with an argument that certain descriptions of 
events yield what he calls a full declension of them while other descriptions do 
not. Danto separates this argument from the appeal to experience. Bul it is not 
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clear LhaL I.he ramifications of I.his argument do not call into question some of 
the findings of the appeal to experience. Consider, to begin with, the descrip­
tions, "moving an arm" and "moving a stone." Danto is right in saying that we 
can decline the first but not the second in the following way: 
(1) M causes 11is arm to move, e.g., by hitting it with his other mm. 
(2) Someone or something other than M causes M's arm to move, e.g., by 
striking it. 
(3) M suffers from a nervous disorder, so his arm moves spasmodically. 
(4) M moves his arm without suffering from a nervous disorder, without 
someone or something causing il to move, or without having to do anything to 
cause it to move. 
This full declension of "moving an arm," Danto says, shows that (1)  and 
(2) are actions (because M does e where e is the effect of some other antecedent 
event), that (3) is not an action (because M does nothing; he is a patient, not an 
agent), and that (4) is a basic action (because M does e without doing anything 
else to do e). 
H also shows why "moving a stone" differs from "moving an arm;" for ( 1 )  
and ( 2 )  may decline "m oving a stone" but ( 4 )  cannot. Hence "moving a stone" 
cannot denote a basic action. Nor can "laughing" yield a full declension. (1), 
(2),  and (3) stand, so that when M laughs by causing himself to laugh by doing 
something else in order to laugh or by being caused to laugh by some other per­
son or some thing, he performs an action. But that he simply laughs (4), without 
(1), ( 2 )  and of course (3:), i.e., because of a nervous disorder, although a possible 
state of affairs for some abnormal individuals, is not the standard case, like M 
simply moving his arm. Mosi of us do not have the true power of laughing as we 
have the true power of moving our arms. (4 ) ".M laughs," therefore, is not a 
basic action; but it is not nonsense as is (4) "'l'he stone (simply) moves." 
A final example Danto offers is "imaging." "M images I" (where "I" stands 
for a mental image) is, like "M moves an arm," a locution that does nol unam­
biguously describe an action and, if it does, a basic one. Nevertheless, the full 
declension works here, loo: (1) M causes I, perhaps by taking a drug; (2) Some­
one or something causes M to have I ;  (3) M is obsessed by l where I is a symptom 
of a nervous disorder; and (4) M simply produces I. Consequently, (4) is a basic 
action, ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  actions, and (3) no aclion at all. 
It is not clear in his essay that Danto regards full declension of certain 
descriptive expressions as a necessary, sufficient, or necessary and sufficient 
criterion o f  action and basic action. Moving an arm and imaging, he says, can be 
actions and basic actions; moving a stone can be an action but it is not a basic 
action; laughing can be an action but only an extraordinary basic action. But, 
now, what about seeing and sitting·? If imaging and moving my arm yield the full 
declension, so do seeing and sitting. Are seeing (or bearing, smelling, tasting, 
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feeling) an<l sitting (or standing, lying down) actions and basic aclions? If full 
declension is a sufficient condition of a basic action, "I see," "l hear," "I sit," 
"I stand,'' etc., where what I do I do ( 1 )  without doing anything else lo do it, 
(2) without someone or something making me do what I do, and (3) without 
suffering from a nervous disorder, but where (1),  (2), and (3) as well as (4 ) arc 
intelligible, as they are, then Lhese expressions also describe basic actions. And if 
they do, our repertoire of basic adions which all normal people are acquainted 
with becomes an expanding universe whose members are identifiable through 
full declension of their corresponding descriptive expressions. 
One may object to my examples: "I see," "T hear," "I sit,'' ''I stand," etc., it 
might be said, are not descriptive expressions of actions or movements at all. 
Rather they are incomplete expressions. One does not simply see, he sees some­
thing; one does not simply sit, he sits on something, and so on. "I see y (e.g., a 
tree)" is the proper expression, like Danto's "I move my arm" or " I  image an 
image" (although the latter sounds fishy). But Danlo does allow "M laughs" 
rather than "M laughs at y (e.g., a joke told by Z)" as a complete description to 
which he denies (normal) full declemion. Consequently, before my examples can 
be ruled out., we need some criterion for distinguishing expressions which are 
amenable to declension, full or not, and expressions which are not so amenable. 
Danto's mixed bag of expressions-"M moves his arm," "M .images l." "M 
laughs," "M moves a stone," "moving an arm," "imaging," "laughing," "moving 
a stone," etc.-includes no such criterion; so it remains unclear whether "I see," 
"I am seeing" and "I sit," "I  am sitting." etc., are any more illegitimate ex­
pressions for declension than "l laugh" or "I  image an image," or "laughing" or 
''imaging." 
There is something peculiar about "l see," etc., as a report on an action or a 
basic action or as a report at all. But the peculiarity, it seems to me, is as much 
with action and basic action as it is with " l  see." Suppose, for example, l say 
when I see, that what I do is to open my eyes. Now, " l  open my eyes" looks 
analogous Lo " I  move my arm." Is ''l open my eyes" fully declinable? Here l 
cannot make sense of (1) or (3): that t open my eyes by doing something else in 
order to open my eyes (i.e., what can I do to open my eyes that is like striking 
my arm to move it?); or that 1 am suffered to open my eyes (i.e., whal nervous 
disorder could make my eyes open?). (2)  seems all right (e.g., that someone 
makes me open my eyes, by waking me. (4), that l simply open my eyes, seems 
impeccable. Is it, therefore, a basic action? Even it' the full declension does not 
work here with "I open my eyes"? 
"I open my eyes" (which is an unexceplionably complete expression} is no 
clearer a description of a basic action or even of an action (since ( 1 )  is suspect) 
than is "I see" (which. fo1· some, is suspect as a description). To be sure, both are 
things we do without l'irst doing something else. So if one is a basic action, so is 
the other. 
The appeal to a repel'loire does not help here either. For I know l can see and 
do see, can open my eyes and do open them. can sit and do sit, can hear and do 
hear, can stand and do stand just as I k!'low I can move my arm and do, can con­
jure up images and do-wilhout knowing how l can and do these things. Are 
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they all in lhe reperloire? If they are, full declension is nol lhe clue to the 
range of the repertoire. If they are not, what in the appeal to lhe repertoire 
brings them in or rules them out? If the criterion is lht! gi\'enness of the action in 
the sense of doing something without doing something else as an antecedent 
causal event. then seeing, opening one's eyes, silting, standing. hearing. lasting, 
lying down, etc., are all basic actions. 
I conclude that Danto's concepl of a basic action is ill-conceived. He separates 
his appeal to our repertoire of basic aclions from his argument of full declension 
of certain descriptive expressions. Yet the repew·toire enlarges and contracts with 
the application of the criterion of full declension as necessary, sufficient. or 
necessary and sufficient. Tf ru11 declension is necessary, "M opens his eyes" 
drops out as a description of a basic ad.ion in the repC'rloire. l f full declension is 
sufficient, "M sees, hears, listens, Last.es, smells, feels, sits, stands, or lies down" 
forces us to enlarge the repertoire. 
lf the criterion of a basic action shifts to what we can and do do without do­
ing anything else as its antecedent causal event, basic actions become cooxlen­
sive with all of our human abilities or powers and their particular manifestations. 
Then my seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, sitting, standing, etc., are as 
much actions and basic actions as my mo,1ing my arm. And if all of these are 
basic actions, perhaps Verity's yawn, with which Danto opens his essay. is a 
basic action too. And if yawning, why not all of our bodily functions. including 
the very basic ones closer to the belly than the mouth'? 
A final puzzle: "M. hurts his finger." This is fully declinable; and it describes 
something M can do and sometimes does without necessarily doing anything 
else as its antecedent causal event. Does it therefore report an action and a 
basic action? Is it rather a report on what M docs not do without first doing 
something else, hence a report on an action but not on a basic action? Or is it 
simply a report on a sensation, hence no action-report at all? As a description, it 
is as ambiguous as "M moved a stone" so, as Danlo says, it could describe an 
action and, if an action, a basic action. Which basic action? M moved his 
finger? M kept his finger still? Neither or nothing seems appropriate. 
A. I. Me Iden concludes his early essay "Action" ( l  956): 6 
" . . .  so in the case of the concept of any action the conLext of practices in 
rules are obeyed, criteria employed, policies are observed-a way of thinking 
and doing-is essential to the understanding of the difference between such 
bodily movements and actions." 
Although Melden argues in this essay that the concept of action is neither 
analyzable nor simple. and it is not non-descriptive, he does lay down, it seems 
to me, at least one necei;sary condition for the correct use of lhe concept: an 
implicit reference to rule-governed behavior. IL is true that he does not identify 
lhis condition with a necessary properly or conslituen t, such as agent causality. 
intentionality, goal-directedness, or teleology that all actions supposedly share. 
Rather, this condition functions as an overall presupposition of there being 
action terms at all. Actions, thus, for Melden, are coextensive with certain bodily 
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movements that are described under the general rubric of social practices. For 
example, signaling a left Lum while driving a car without mechanical signals is 
the raising of one's arm in the specific context of the prevailing rules of the road. 
The difference between "X signaled" or even "X raised his arm" and ''X's arm 
wenl up"-between action and bodily movemenl-is not in the components or 
the psychological accompaniments of the movement but in the circumstances 
surrounding the movement.. 
Actions. Melden reminds us, form a large, extremely varied class, ranging 
from habitual responses Lo rational decision. Some involve mere wants, without 
reasons; others involve motives; still others, deliberation, reasons, choices. All 
of course are done by agents, but not by their unique causal agency. Nor is goal­
directedness, intentionality, or leleology always present. Bodily movement is 
always present but only as an entailed condition and never as a component of 
action. Thus, it seems, both bodily movement and social practice are necessary 
for action. Nevertheless for �Ielde1:, only social practice is a necessary condition 
or criterion of the concept of action. If the social context of practices be re­
garded as a presupposition of Lhe concept of action, perhaps bodily movement 
can be construed as a precondition of Lhe concept. Thus on Melden's view, there 
cannot be actions or true-false action reports unless lhere are bodily movements; 
bul these actions and their descriptions involve essential reference to social 
practices and no reference Lo bodily movement. 
To illustrate the difference between bodily movement and action and to 
illuminate Lhe essentially rule-governed character of the latter, l\lelden considers 
chess moves. (He also implies that although it is a highly sophisticated example 
or action, playing chess is subject lo moral review. However, Lhal playing chess, 
in contrast lo doing practically nothing else, is a moral activity. is extremely 
dubious and to be arguf'd for only by some extended, persuasive definition of 
morality.) 
Suppose, now, a game of chess in progress. X moves his knight; Y then castles. 
Here there is bodily movement. But what else? Theories according to which 
these chess moves are combinations or blends of bodily movements (i.e., finger 
movements) and psychological processes (e.g., volitions followed by movements 
or deliberations followed by decisions).  Melden argues here (as well as more 
fully in his later book Pree Action) are not only indefensible in lhemsel\'es but, 
more important, fatally indifferent to the essentially contextual, social character 
of action. "To attempt_ to understand a move in a game of chess in terms of 
bodily and psychological processes occurring at the Lime the agent makes his 
move is to leave out what is essential to the move-the fact that what transpires 
in the way of such occurrent processes is a case of following the rules" (p. 534 ). 
In their total concern for bodily movements and their psychological causes and 
accompaniments, these theories in effect fail to elucidate the concept of action­
such is Melden's major criticism of previous analyses or theories of action. 
What, then, is the correct elucidation of the concept of action? Following 
Wittgenstein, Melden reminds us of the varying uses of the concept: the diverse 
roles of different kinds of action verbs. However, and here he is on his own, 
essential to all these uses is the condition of following or obeying given rules. 
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Action concepts, whatever their use, are social in character, "fogically connected 
with the concept of rules'' (p, 532). 
Rule-governed behavior alone, Melden claims. can explain �he dislinction 
between mere movement and action. Thus-to return Lo our che� game-X can· 
not move b'is knigH nor can Y caslle unless they move their fingers. But reports 
on X's and Y's chess moves are nol about their finger movements. only aboul 
their rule-go\•erned beha\·ior. 
Of course. Melden allows, a child could move a knight l'rom one square to 
another or move the rook and the king in accordance wilh the castling rule of 
chess. But he is not thereby following or obeving the rules. He may perform an 
action but not thal or moving a knight or of castling. Only one who is versed in 
lhe practices of chess can do thal. 
Is Melden correct in his claim. i f  1 have interpreted him rightly, that rulc­
governed behavior i3 at. least one necessary condilion of the concept of aclion'? 
IL seems to me that, like other putative necessary conditions. which at best lurn 
out. Lo be among the sufficient. conditions of the concept, that rule-governed 
behavior is also a sufficienl condition-a good reason for something being or 
being said to be an action. "Caslling in chess. is an action because il involves 
application of the nles of chess" is as secure a slatement about actions as any 
such statement can be. 
Bul is this condition necessary? R. Taylor. for one, disagrees. "I raise my 
arm" entails "my ann rises." Action implies movement, and my raising my arm 
is an action whether it is described in its social context or not. For Melden, 
Taylor's responsible agent who simpl) raises his arm or wiggles his finger and for 
whom social practices here are irrelevant-that is, who is not signaling, salu Ung, 
exercising, etc.-is not acting. " . . .  In that case, when the individual raises his 
arm what happens is th.al a bodily movement. not. an acLion, occurs,, (p. 541). 
Since Melden admits that il is conceptually possible for an agent to raise his arm 
independently of a social context, the issue bet.ween him and Taylor reduces to 
whether such an occurrence is an action or not. This issue is analogous to 
whether there can be and are actions without. causal agency, intentionality, goal­
direcledness, endeavor, or teleology. Consequently, Melden is in basic disagree­
ment about action not only with R. Taylor bul with C. Taylor, Chisholm and 
Oanto as weU. for all of  whom social practice or rule-governed behavior is not 
essentially or even always relevant to action. 
Another difficulty with Melden's necessary condition is lhat it does not. cover 
adequately those cases where we acL or perform actions witihout following the 
gh·en rules or even, for that matter, wilhoul being in accordance wilh any 
rules, but only in accordance with certain natural regularities or physical laws. 
'fhe tele\ision repair man, for example, fixes the broken set. Like lhe chess 
player who castles. he applies the rules and recipes he has learned in his crafl. "X 
fixed the set" as against. "X moved a few tools with his fingers" describes an 
action in Melden's sense of rule-governed beha\tior. But if a child kicks Lhe �t or 
jiggles it, so that it works, do we want lo say he merely kicked it or jiggled il but 
fixed nothing, as we might justly want to say he did not castle by simply mo,·ing 
two chess pieces? Just as an infant can kill a man without murdering him, why 
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can't a child fix the set without following any rules or without even being in 
accordance wiLh Lhc rules? Whal are lhe rules for television repair? Certair. 
recipes derived from physical laws which govern the behavior of the repairman as 
he fixes the set. But if the child or you or I fixes il by roughing it up, did we 
perform an action or not? If not, why not? Melden's recourse to doing some­
thing in accordance with the rules of repair is an amusing mix-up of rules and 
laws. Of course if one fixes lhe set by roughing it up. he must have done some­
thing in accordance with the physical laws governing television sets, unles.c;, 
miraculously, he performed a mi�acle. 
There are thus all kinds of things we do-from breaking things to fixing 
them-where we follow no rules or what we do is in accordance with no rules-­
that compete (or the name of action. In spite of his admonition about general­
izing from Loo few cases and his insistence on the class of actions as a family of 
cases rather than as a core o f  stro:ig cases with its characteristic marginal cases, 
Melden in denying t.hese non rule-governed occurrences as action repudiates the 
philosophical practice he preaches. Elucidation of the concept of action does not 
yield Mclden's necessary condition, any more than traditional analyses do. 
In Free J\clion (1961 ),7 Melden turns from a primary concern for the 
elucidation of the concept of ac�ion lo an investigation of the concepts of 
volition, intention, and desire, as they relate to action. His central thesis is that 
neither acls of will, motives as intentions, nor desires or wants are occurrences 
which function as causal antecedents of actions. Rather, they are either non­
occurrences, as in the case of acts of will, or occunences whose descriptions 
involve concepts, such as intention and desire, that presuppose the concept of 
action. Intentions and desires cannot cause actions since they logically imply 
aclions. 
Action Mel den takes as a primitive concept. It is not thereby indefinable, i.e., 
unamenablc to further analysis: but not because it is simple, rather because 
analysis is suspect. Il is primitive in the sense that it and its correlative-agent­
are the starting point in the whole complicated nexus of human actions. If we 
turn from the denotation of "action" Lo its meaning or role, we find that 
" . . .  no account of the concept o� action will do that does not atlend to the 
status of a person as a practical being, one who is not only endowed with t.he 
primitive ability Lo move his limbs but who in his complex dealings with others, 
acts as he does for the very many sorts of reasons that operate in conduct and 
out of concern with a variety· o f  envisaged goods" (pp. 80-81 ) .  
Human beings who d o  things for reasons with proper attenlion to what they 
are about: this is where lhe philosophy of action starts, not with the abstract 
notion of an action or an agent as such. So the concept of an action is a social 
one after all. But is the social still essential as it is in his early essay? Me Iden 
denies in this book that it is a necessary condition. For example, one can 
correctly say of a person that he is raising his arm for no reason at all or for no 
social or moral reason. It  is  therefore possible, he concedes, to have a co11ceplion 
of a human action without social and moral conventions and rules. Yet, he adds: 
"Lo understand lhe concept. of a human action we need Lo understand the 
possibilities of descriptions in social and moral terms . . .  " (p.  180; italics in 
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original). 
Does this mean that the concept of action is essentially social and that some 
concepts of particular actions describe limiting cases of adion, to be understood 
as actions even without conventions or rules only because we already under­
stand the pervasive social context of action? Such a reading of Melden's view 
reflects his general observation that although iL is true that people sometimes me, 
desire something without doing anything to get it, or do nothing with what they 
want and already have. it is logically impossible that they should always lie, 
desire something without doing anything to get it, or do nothing with what 
they want and already have. Consequently, although it is true that some­
Limes people act without reasons, it is logically impossible thal they ahvays do. 
Hence it is conceptually necessary that action is social, even for its li miting cases. 
Therefore a necessary condition for saying o f  anything that it is an action. even 
of an action without reasons, rules, or conventions, is that iL is social, practical 
rule-governed. Limiting cases, therefore, are abrogations o f  ruUes, not examples 
or non rule-governed behavior. 
Action, thus, if my readjng of Melden is correct, is Cor him e�ther following or 
brealling the regulations and conventions of social practices. In either case, 
action is still rule-governed. This must be Melden's final position if it is to be 
saved from self-con tradiction: in spite of his admission o f  counterexamples 
which for him are counter only because they presuppose examples of action. 
Thal the concept of action is essentially social, involving human beings in 
transaction with each other, doing things for reasons, of course, applies to 
humans as agents but :lot to agents as causes, either in the Humean sense of 
collections of antecedent events in the causal chain or in Lhe metaphysical 
sense of centers o f  power or efficacy. This metaphysical sense, shared by 
traditional philosophers a s  well as by C. Taylor, R. Taylor, and Chisholm, 
Melden rejects as an unnecessary appendage to the concept of action, imposed 
on it by the implausible doctrine of action as psychological ly caused bodily 
movement. Agents can no more cause actions than desires, intentions, or acts 
of will for, like these latter, they logically imply, hence cannot cause, actions. 
For Melden, then, agency-the causal power or efficacy of agents-is not only 
not a necessary jngredient of action as it is for C. Taylor, R. Taylor and 
Chisholm; it is not an ingredient at all. Here, then, js another issue among our 
theorists: Is agency a necessary constituent of' human action, indeed, a con­
stituent at all? What kind o f  disagreement is this? 
In Free Action, Melden takes as his fundamentaJ problem Lhe explanation of 
the distinction between movement and action. As noted, his central claim is that 
the distinction cannot be explicated in terms o f  the order of ca.uses. Much of his 
argument is a sustained refutation o f  certain views about this order: that action 
is volition followed by bodily movement; that action is intention making move­
ments happen; that action is desire of certain ends together with beliefs about 
the means of achieving these ends. 
To simplify his argument against the causal theories of action, Melden once 
again considers the action of signaling while driving a car. In describing what 
happens we may distinguish between (1) "A signals," (2) "A raises his arm," 
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and (3) "A's muscles are moving." (1) and (2) are different, action reports about 
different actions but they are about the same movement or occurrence-A's arm 
rising; (3) differs from (1) and (2) in that it is not a report on an action at all. 
Further, (1) and (2) relate in a way that (2) and (3) do not: A signals by 
raising his arm; however, he does not raise his arm by his muscles moving, even 
though his muscles mO\'ing cause his arm to rise. Neither does A move his 
muscles by raising his arm nor does A raise his arm by moving his muscles. So if 
we introduce (4) "A moves his muscles," (2) is not related to (4) as ( 1 )  is Lo (2). 
A does nol raise his arm by movir.g his muscles, as A signals by raising his arm. 
How does A signal? is answered: By raising his arm. How does A raise his arm? 
has a different kind of answer: He just does-it is a primitive ability he comes to 
possess independently of any acquired, applied knowledge about muscle move­
ments. 
Causal theories of action interpret (1). (2), and (4) as bodily movement 
caused by antecedent psychological events, such as volitions, intentions, and 
desires. The gap between the physiological happenings of the arm going up and 
the muscles moving is filled by the psychological happenings o f  acts of will, 
intention. or desire. Melden's basic argumenl againsl lhis causal bridging of the 
gap is that it requires the existence of independently identifiable events which 
cannot be found. However, they cannot be found not because they are empiri­
cally undiscoverable but because they are logically impossible. Volitions are 
logically tied to physical movements: intentions and desires, lo actions. Hence 
the concepts of volition, intention, and desire and their logical im plicates of 
movement and action render impossible any causal account of aclion in terms 
of volition, intention, or desire. It is logically impossible, not merely empiri­
cally false, that actions are caused by thal which implies lhem. 
Having gone this far, it is hard to understand why Melden does not also 
reject as incoherent the Humean concept of causality. For in the sense in which, 
say, desire logically implies desire for something which logically implies doing 
something to get what one desires, cause logically implies effect; so that the very 
notion of a cause without its effect, i.e., the possibility of identifying a cause 
independently of its effect, is logically impossible. If the causal theories of 
action are incoherent, so too, on Melden's argument that logical implicates 
cannot be causally related, is the causal theory of events. lf cause logically im­
plies effect, nothing can be an antecedent cause of any effect. 
Melden's final point is that explanations of actions involve reasons, not causes. 
Actions are doings and not making things happen: neither implies the other. 
Doings have reasons; happenings and makings have causes. l\Iotives. intentions, 
desires, wants-none either necessary or sufficient for actions, nevertheless all 
action-tied concepts-mark out reasons for what we do, not the causes of our 
bodily movements that transmute these movements into actions. The intro­
duction of particular motives, intentions, desires, and wants in our description of 
an action explains the action by giving its reasons and in this manner clarifies 
the action and the character of the agent. To insist, that such clarification is not 
explanation because it is not causal is lo vitiate the entire distinction between 
action and movement by reducing all actions to sequences of happenings. 
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In his essay, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes,"8 Donald Davidson shins from 
a theory of human action to a theory of the explanation of human action when 
such explanation involves reasons. AgenL A does or did x. Instead of asking what 
makes x an action, Davidson asks, what is the relation between reason and action 
when reason explains-"rationalizes"-the action by giving the agent's reason for 
doing what he did. The relation, he claims, is causal , not logical, as Melden and 
others say. A does or did x. X is picked out, described or redescribed, and 
rationalized by naming as its cause A's pro attitude toward actions of type x 
and/or A's belief about such actions. When the reason given why A did x under 
a certain description of x consists of A's pro attitude toward actions with a 
certain properly and of A's belief that x so described has that property. the 
reason is the primary reason why A performed x. Davidson states two theses 
about primary reasons: (1)  I.hat a primary reason is necessary and sufficient. for 
the rationalization of an action; and (2) that it causes the action. 
Although Davidson argues for these two theses separately, he does not discuss 
the relation between them. Nevertheless, if  rationalizations are causal explana­
tions, as he contends, then (1) entails (2). That is, there can be no rationaliza. 
tions of human actions if there are no primary reasons that cause them. Con· 
sequently his theory of explanation of actions-or the causal role of reasons in 
them-rests upon a theory or the makings of a theory of human action. Hence 
there is no real shift in Davidson's discussion of the problem of the nature of 
human action at all. For in stating what he regards as necessary and suffic'ient 
conditions of the explanation of human action, Davidson implies that pro 
attitudes and related beliefs-primary reasons-are at least necessary and causal 
conditions of human acLions. His two theses, therefore, reduce to one thesis 
about human actions: that they are what we do when what we do is caused by 
our particular pro attitudes and related beliefs. If  there are not such causes, both 
of his theses collapse. Absolutely central and crucial in bis whole doctrine of the 
explanation of action, then, is his supporting evidence for primary reasons as the 
causes of action. 
In supporting his case for reasons as causes, Davidson distinguishes between 
"Can reasons be causes of actions"? and "Are reasons causes of actions"? al­
though he seems to assume that the truth of the first is evidence for the truth of 
the second, which it is not. He centers on Melden's paradigm: "A raised his arm 
because he wanted lo signal." Melden says that the "because" clause gi,1es a 
reason which explains the action in the social context of driving and the rules of 
the road. As a reason, it its logically tied to the action; and since causes must be 
logically distinct from lb,eir effects, "wanted to signal" cannot name a cause. 
Indeed, for Melden, "raising one's arm"-the action-is a criterion for "wanting 
to signal:" this is the logical tie Me Iden affirms. 
Davidson agrees that the "because" clause gives a reason but insists that this 
reason-"he wanted to signal"-names the cause of the action of the raising o( 
the arm. Confusing, or anyhow so it  seems lo me, Melden's point that the logical 
tie is between the action and the want, i.e., that the raising of the arm is a 
criterion of wanting to signal-a logical Lie between the effect and the want­
with an entirely different point that there is a logical tie bet.ween "wanting to 
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signal" as a cause and "raising one's arm" as an action, Davidson correctly dis· 
misses this taller logical Lie. BuL tnis dismissal does nol show Lhal reasons are 
logically independenl of actions; all it. shows is that actions are logically indepen­
dent or causes. 
Are reasons causes of action? If they are, Davidson agrees with Melden. they 
are events that precede their effecls. Melden then says that there are no such 
events: no wants or beliefs thal can be isolated and identified as causes of our 
actions. Davidson replies that there are such event.s: wants and related beliefs­
primary reasons-that can be isolated and identified as the causes o f  our actions. 
That there are such events and that they are mental, Davidson suggests, has been 
denied because philosophers have confused observings and nolicing�awareness­
with what is observed or noticed. Consider again Melden's driver who raises his 
arm to signal a lurn: "But of course there is a mental event.; al some moment the 
driver noticed (or thought. he noticed) his turn coming up, and that is the 
moment he signaled . . .  To dignify a driver's awareness Lhal his turn has come 
by calling it an experience, much :ess a feeling, is no doubt exaggerated, but 
whether il deserves a name or nol, i/ had belter be the reason why lie raises his 
arm" (p. 74; my italics). 
If the driver's awareness that his Lurn has come is "the reason why" he 
raises his arm. Lhen surely this awareness, because it is not a pro attitude and 
belief, cannot be a primary reason; and if it is nol a primary reason, it cannol be 
the cause of the driver's raising his arm, according lo Davidson's thesis (2). 
This example, rather than showing that pro attitudes and related beliefs­
primary reasons-are antecedent mental events t.hal cause actions, shows only, 
if it shows anything at all, that some actions, e.g., raising one's .arm or signaling, 
are caused by a mental event: noticing that one's turn has come. This noticing, 
rather Lhan a reason funclioning as a cause, is a cause thaL functions as a reason 
in the explanation of why the driver raised his arm to signal. 
lt is this distinction between reasons as causes and causes as reasons in the 
explanation o f  human actions, and not the presence of awareness, that has been 
overlooked by philosophers in Lheir discussion of this problem o f  the role of 
reason i n  human action. Both Melden and Davidson conflate this distinction. 
Melden confuses his denial that reasons are causes with his denial that causes are 
reasons in the explanation of human action; which is why he restricts causes to 
bodily movements and reasons to aclion. Davidson con fuses his insight that 
causes can serve as reasons in an explanation of an action with his claim that 
reasons are causes of action: which is why he identifies these causes wilh the 
reasons for action. Melden has not shown that among the explanatory reasons 
for an aclion may be slatements abouL its causes; nor has Davidson shown Lhat 
among the causes of an action is it.s primary reason. 
Explanation of human action is indeed a complex problem. The distinction 
bet.ween reasons as causes and causes as reasons must enler into any adequat.e 
theory of such explanation. Davidson's theory-that all explanation is causal, 
hence that rationalization (or justification, or giving reasons for) is a species of 
causal explanation-does not do justice to the distinction. For even i f  Lhe cause 
of an action serves as a reason in its explanation, it does not follow that the 
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reason for the action is its cause, whereas if Lhe reason for an action is its cause, 
il does follow thal the cause of the action is the reason for lhe action. No 
causal theory of explanation can account for this asymmetry between causes as 
reasons and reasons as causes. 
Davidson, thus, has showed neither that reasons can be causes of human 
aclion nor that lhey are the causes of human action. Hence he has provided no 
e\•idence that. a neceS>ary ingredient or condition of a human action is its 
primary reason-its pro attitude and related belief-which functions as an ante· 
ccdently identifiable mental event that causes the action. In so far as his theory 
of explanation rests upon his partial theory of action. he has therefore nol 
shown that all actions share the common property of primary reason o r  even 
that they share some other property. Whal he has shown is that at least some 
actions have as their causes certain mental evenls and t.hat these can properly 
enler inlo the explanation of lhese actions. Perhaps citing these causes is telling 
or explaining wby certain actions are perrorr::ned and can serve as reasons for 
actions or as terms in the "because" clause. But thal this pro<·edure is ide111Lical 
with or is convertible into Lhe cilat.ion o f  primary reasons rema·ns mere 
speculation. 
J. L. Austin's "A Pica for Excuses"9 is universally regarded as a seminal essay 
in contemporary philosophy of human action. H was lhe first Lo raise funda· 
mental quest.ions about the criteria of the identily and individuation of actions: 
" . . .  whal, indeed, arP the rules for lhe use o f  'lhe· action, 'an• action, 'one' 
aclion a 1pare or ·phase, of an action and the like" (p. 127)? about the distinc­
tion between doing and acting: ls sneeiing, breathing, or even simply siLLing in 
my chair an action? and about the relation between the language of excuses and 
of action: Are all actions excusable or only those that are wayward in some 
clearly statable sense'? 
What has not been noticed is t.hat Austin's essay does more than challenge a 
theory of action-in the sense o f  a statement about. the common, definitive 
properties of all actions-but, as important, it is the first lo suggest that although 
there are no established necessary condit.ions of human action, there are 
sufficient conditions, Lwo o f  which he stales: justification and excuse. For his 
mosl fundamental thesis-and his central contribution to the philosophy of 
action-is lhat though there are actions. abstractly describable by the dummy 
expression, "A performs an action," concretely but variously describable by 
certain verhs. their adverbs or modifying nouns or prepositions, and tha. actions 
form certain sub-classes. actions ha\·e only sufficient, not necessary conditions. 
Thus the concept of action, even as a dummy concept, is go\lerned by sufficient 
criteria, nol necessary ones. 
A did or does x. Instead of asking what makes x an action, Austin asks, what 
does excusing (or juslif�fog) x re\•eal about x as an action? Nol every doing of 
any x by A is amenable Lo excuse or justification: x must be (or said to be)i bad, 
wrong, inept, unwelcome-untoward. This rules out excusability and. more 
surprising, justifiability as a necessary criterion of action. For just as not every 
act is excusable, so too not every act requires justification. Some acts are 
neither, since they are not untoward; and though excusability or justifiability is 
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not esseniial lo action, doing wbal is regarded as the untoward is necessary for 
both excusability and justifiability. Austin Lhus lays down no set of condilions 
for all actions, only lwo sufficient conditions for some actions, when Lhese 
latier actions satisfy ihe necessary condition of being (or being said l.o be) un­
toward. 
MoreO\·er, some actions, giver. certain standards of acceptable behavior, are 
inexcusable, for example, stepping on a baby's loes; this is another reason why 
excusability is not a necessary criterion of aclion. Nevertheless, a good reason 
for something being an action or being called an action is that the specified 
action-when untoward-is open to excuse or to justification. 
If excuse and justification serve as sufficient conditions of actions, what, 
now, about praise or blame? Austin Lreats blame like excuse: a necessary con­
dition of both is that what is blamed or excused is the untoward. Will this do for 
praise? Can we praise any action-untoward or not? If  we can, praise di ffers 
logically from blame, for the necessary condition of lhe untoward vanishes. 
E,·en if we admit that blame, like the attribution of "voluntary" or "involun­
tary," is inappropriate to all actions, is il so clear that we applaud actions only 
when some necessary condition of the unusual or abnormal is satisfied'? Of 
course we do not applaud all actions but we do praise many which are usual and 
normal in every way. A takes an examination and fails. Here blame, excuse, 
even justification can come in. But if B-a good student. not just a dubious one­
passes, his teacher can praise him wiLhoul in any way presupposing that B's per­
formance was abnormal. 
Praise, therefore, is also a good reason for something being (or being called) 
an action. AHhough it differs from blame in that it has no necessary condition 
of the wayward, it is like blame in that il too is not a necessary, bul rather a 
sufficient, condition of action. What charactei-izes excuse, justification, praise, 
blame, or the voluntary, namely, that lhough each has its own special con­
ditions of use, none is necessary for human action, applies as well Lo intention, 
purpose, and motive. All provide good reasons for something being or being 
described as an action; but none is necessary. Each is a sufficient condition, 
marking out. a distinguishing featt.re of the different sub-classes of lhe class of 
aclions. 
Does Auslin show that the proffering of an excuse is a sufficient condition or 
crilerion of action? He has certainly shown it is not necessary. But is it always in 
any situation a good reason, a sufficient. reason. for saying of x when A did or 
does x, that x is an action? Austin suggests that excuses are not only sufficient 
conditions of actions but amso that different kinds of excuses point Lo different 
aspects of actions: their stages (the intelligence, appreciation. planning, decision, 
and execution involved); their phases (e.g., the difference between putting a dab 
of paint on a cam·as and painting the whole picture); and their stretches (smaller 
as against larger groups of events). Austin does not claim that all actions are or 
can be rendered complex in this way; once again, all he argues is that some ex­
cuses are sufficient both for something being (or being described as) an action as 
well as for something being (or being parcelled out as) a slage, phase, or stretch 
of an action. Excuses, consequently, constitute a whole class of different 
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varieties of sufricient conditions. For example, in his famous Negina u. Finney 
illustration, Austin poinls oul that Finney's artion, whether specified as turning 
on the wrong tap or as scalding Watkins, is excusable but thal the excuse that 
wbat he did was inadvertent applies only Lo one phase of Lhe action, while Lhe 
excuse that what he did was an accident applies Lo a different phase. 
Now. if we grant, as il'lldeed l think we must, that Austin presents a brilliant 
case for the varieties of excuses, exempli Cied in certain verbs and especially their 
adverbs, as these excuses point to different aspects of actions. must we accept 
excusability as a sufficient condition of action'? Austin admits that excuses play 
a larger role than he describes, so Lhat the excuse of politeness-"Excuse me, 
please!"-differs from the excuse of accusation. But he also admits that. even in 
the primary sit.uation ("in general", p. 123), where someone is accused of or is 
said Lo have done the untoward, an excuse can be offered which cancels, not 
merely mi ligates, the responsibility. Here excuse does not. qualify the aclion; it 
denies Lhe action. To deny the action by an excuse that cancels the responsi· 
biliLy, Austin implies, does not entail Lhat. responsibility is necessary for action; 
all this denial entails is that the absence of responsibility is sufficienL for no 
action. 
For Austin, then, Lhere are some excuses that do not qualify actions; from 
which it follows that excusability is not a sufficient condition for action. I f  A 
did x and is accused of doing x, where both A and his accuser accept. x as bad, 
and A pleads and proves that he was forced Lo do x or. like Finney, that he 
scalded Watkins by mistakenly thinking Watkins was out of the tub, which Wat· 
kins was able and supposed Lo be, A's excuse. in cancelling the responsibility, 
cancels the acl. ln Finney's case, he was nol only acquitted of manslaughter by 
the judge; he is also relieved of his action of scalding t.hrough his cancellation of 
responsibility by Aust.in. Excuse, therefore, even for Austin, is not a sufCicient 
condition of action. Consequently we must conclude that what Austin shows in 
"A Plea for Excuses" is nol merely that the concept of action. has no necessary, 
only sufficient, criteria but that excuses, unlike justifications, are not members 
of the class of sufficient criteria. To be able to excuse x when A did or does x 
may be a reason why we caU x an action but iL is nol a sufficient reason. Justifi­
cation, praise, blame, intenlion, purpose. and responsibility, among others, he 
also allows us to infer, are both good reasons and sufficient criteria for some­
thing being or being described as an aclion. At any rate, Lhis thesis-that the con­
cept of a human action is governed by criLeria, some of which are sufficient, bul 
none of which is necessary-first suggested (at least to me) by Austin's essay, is 
the t.hesis I wish to contend best illumines the logical grammar of that concept. 
That x is a human action because it is goal-directed, agen t-caused, basic or 
caused by a basic action, intentional, governed by conventions, or done for a 
reason, each of which functions as a necessary condition in the individuaJ con­
temporary theories of action already considered, is at best, provided it can first 
be rendered intelligible as a criterion. a sufficient condition of such action. 
Whal is a human action? ls the class of human actions distinct from Lhe class 
of human (and other) movements, processes, events? How do we decide whether 
a particular x is a human action'? What counts as a good reason for an x being a 
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human action: what answers why x is a human action? 
These are the main questions our contemporar) theories tr) to answer. Ea"h 
o f  these lheories, whether it lakes human action or its concept to be definable or 
not, I have tried to show. offers at least a nece�r) property. fC>ature. condition, 
or criterion: some proffer necessary and sufficient properties. Presumably, an 
ideal theory-the theory or human aclion-would be the one that formulated 
lhe dennilive set or properties shared by all human actions. 
Among these putalively neces.5ary properties, either affirmed or implied by 
the various theories, are: agency, respon�i bilill , intention, intentionalit) or 
goal-directedness (purpose), an agent making one thin� happen in the endea,or 
lo make another thing happen, an agent causing thinj!s lo h:tppen without first 
causing other things to happen. reason that funclions as cause, and com-enlion. 
These properties serve as necessary or as definilive criteria of the identity and 
individuation or a human action in the various theories. They function as basic 
not only in answering what is a human action but. also why is x or whether x is a 
human aclion'? H is also these properties and c:rilcria lhat determine the nature 
and range of good reasons for anything being a human action. 
Are there such properties? Are they necessary for human action? The theo­
rists disagree among themselves: for each, some of these properties are non­
existent or, allowing that the) do exist. the� are not necessary, sufficient, or 
even relevant to human action. The) also disagree about the nature of these pro­
perties: what constitutes agenc) . intention, purpose, or rc.>ason in human action. 
All they agree on is that some of the claims about necessar) properties-his 
opponenls'-are false? and that at least one of the claims his o'" n-is true. 
ls an) claim that there is a necessary property of human action true? I have 
argued that none slated by our Lheorists is true. Thus, C. Ta) lot says LhaL human 
action is intentional behavior. But he does not show that the class of human 
actions is coextensive with the class of intentional behavior. Nor does he show 
that the latter class is coextensive with the class of clear cases of human action. 
Whal he does is to mark out a class of "strong" cases of human action-those 
that are intentional-and to give an account of llwse in terms of non-contingent. 
irreducibly teleological laws. The concept of human atlion, consequently for 
him, becomes a core concept: one that gets its dcrirulive criteria from the shared 
properties oC the "strong.. ca�es. Thal there are lhese •·slrong" cases-of 
intentional behavior-seems indisputable, however debatable his account or his 
interpretation of them as lhe core of human action. For his core concept does 
not cover equally indisputable, clear cases of human action. All that remains in­
tact in his theory is that some indisputable examples of human action are un­
deniable cases of intentional behavior. "X is a human action because A intended 
x" gives a (tautological!)) necessary reason for x being intentional, but only a 
sufficient reason for x as intentional being a human action. 
R. Ta}lor implies that agency-the human being as causal!) efficacious-is a 
necessary properl}' of all human actions. This, loo, is questionable, both as a 
property and, if a propert)' . as necessary for all action. I have argued lhal if 
agenc} is a properly il can be identified. and that to be identified its corre­
sponding name must have some criterion lo determine its correct identification 
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but that on Taylor's reading of the lerm1 it has no such criterion. '· Agency," for 
Taylor, becomes a word or concept that each of us supposedly learns for l1im­
self and Leaches others Lo use wit.h Lhe sole putative criterion of lhe individllal's 
experience or agenc). Such an inner criterion. howe\'er, is no criterion at all 
because it. serves to identify nothing. And if il identifies nothing. i l  is no word or 
concept either; it plays no role in any language of human action. Taylor·s argu­
ment against Lhe privacy of "desire" applies equally to his private "agenc) ." 
Chisholm also maintains that agency-the agent as immanent cause-is neces· 
sary (and, if necessary. certainly intelligible). Like R. Taylor. he rests his claim 
that there is agency and that il is necessary for all human action on oui· ex· 
perience of causal efficacy: "It is only by underslanding our own causal effi­
cacy, as agents, lhat we can grasp the concept of cause al all" ('"Freedom and 
Aclion.'' op. cit., p. 22; italics in original). This ultimate appeal to individual. 
inner experience also entails. as il does for R. Taylor, an incoherent doc:rine of 
causality, namely, that causality is ultimately private, consequently that the con­
cept. of cause is governed by the necessary and sufficient crit..<'rion of one's own 
experience of causal efficacy. 
However irreducible scat..ements about human ability and hu man action are to 
olher statements about events and their Humean causal regularities, it does not 
follow from this irreducibility alone that there are centers of power-causal 
efficacy-or that agents ae immanent, not transeu nl, causes o f  events . . \II that 
follows is lhat there are no intensional or extensional equivalents of statements 
about human abilities and act.ions. Thus, R. Taylor and Chisholm (and others, 
loo, including Austin) ace correct in contending that "I can move my finge1" 
and "I am moving my finger" are not reducible to conditional statements or to 
statements about events. But that "I" or "can" or "move" i n  these statements 
refers to a center of causal efficac)-ngency-does not follow from this irredul'i· 
bility. Thal l hese statements do refer to such agency requires a furlher argum�nt 
or evidence that there is this unique center which distinguishes action from 
movement. Neither Taylor nor Chisholm provides lhis argument or evidence; 
nor, il seems Lo me, can they provide il without rendering incoherent lhe con­
cept of agency. Our talk about human ability and acLion, it. can be argued. pre· 
supposes thal Lhere are egents or persons-the authors of actions; other.vise we 
cannot make intelligible an essential part of our ordinary referring use of lan­
guage. It is also cogenL to hypothesize agency as a necessary presu pposition of 
the intelligibility of such talk, in which case agency is conceh'ed of Ll trans· 
cendental, non-empirical terms, perhaps like agents as substances. But lhaL our 
talk of human ability and action refers to. names, or describes inner agcnry­
man's unique causal efficacy-is no condition, either necessary, suffidenL, or 
even intell igibl<!, or that talk. 
Chisholm also affirms that an agent making one thing happen in the endeavor 
to make another thing happen is a neceS!>ary, albeit indefinable, properl} of all 
human actions. As we ha\'e seen, this criterion also hns its difficulties; for 
example, some of our actions invohe making things happen but nol in the 
endeavor lo make olher things happen. Even so, this crilcrion is as clear as that 
of intention-as imprecise as both may be-and can therefore serve as a criterion 
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of tbe concept of action, which agency cannot. Consequently, ·without debating 
the criterion , let us accept making B happen in the endeavor to make A happen 
as an intelligible property in order to ask whether it is an omn1present feature of 
all human actions'? 
It seems Lo me it is not. To be sure, there are many recognized, indisputable 
examples of human action in which we do make one thing happen in the 
endeavor to make something else happen or to prevent it from happening. Yet, 
even if  we grant that all descriptions o f  human actions can be paraphrased inlo 
the terms of making B happen in the endeavor lo make A happen. it is simply 
not true that aJI redescriptions of actions can be so paraphrased. To revert to 
my previous example: I may clear my walk of ice and snow or not clear it. �ly 
act of clearing it or not can be redescribed as obeying or breaking the law. As 
strained as i t  is to talk of not clearing my walk as making something happen in 
the endeavor lo make or prevent something else happening, iL is very odd indeed 
to Lalk of obeying or breaking the law in these terms. Making B happen in the 
endeavor to make A happen may be a criterion of the descriptive use of 
"action;" but it is no criterion of the impulative use, hence it. is not a necessary 
criterion, applicable to all actions. 
Danto's implicit doctrine that all actions include as a necessary ingredient a 
basic action, I have argued, does not establish basic action as either necessary 
or sufficient. Indeed, as he formulates it, it 1s difficult lo ascertain whether 
basic aclion is a condition al all. Neither declension nor appeal to our reper­
toire of acts provides a necessary or sufficient condition for deciding what is to 
count as a basic action. What about his criterion of an agent making event e to 
occur without first making event d to occur as the cause of e? In the sense that 
we can and do move our arm wit�.out first causing something else to do it. for 
example, striking it, there are basic acts. But then, on this view, basic acts and 
actions include many bodily functions, some very basic i11deed, which functions 
are usually classified among the processes or movements of nature. Thus, if 
there are basic acts or basic actions in Danto's causal sense, they cannot serve lo 
distinguish action from movement. consequently they can furnish no answer to 
what differentiates action from non-action in human (and animal) behavior. 
That all human actions are goal-directed or are conventional-C. Taylor's and 
Melden's respective doctrines abouL nece�y properties-also are exaggerated. 
As we have seen from those examples o f  action t.hat are neither goal-directed nor 
governed by conventions, to be rejected as clear cases of human action only by 
arbitrary stipulation, lhese two conditions are not necessary, but sufficient. 
The more important issue raised by this appeal to goals or conventions, in 
which reasons having to do with these goals or conventions are offered as 
answers to why a particular action was done or why a particular x is an action, 
is the issue raised by Davidson: that these reasons, when they are introduced 
Lo explain actions, denote the causes of actions. 
I have discussed this issue: Davidson, I argued, does not show that reasons 
are causes or that they can function as causes of aclion. Nevertheless, in spite 
of his conflation of a mental event as a cause of an action wiLh the primary 
reason as lhe cause, Lhe possibility remains lhal our pro attitudes and beliefs, 
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our goals and conventions. or our wants and beliefs about realit.ing .hem the 
reasons for our actions-are causes: and. indeed, so does the po�ibilil:v he urges, 
thaL all action is caused b) reasons. lf it t'Ould be shown lhal nothing 1s an 
action wiLhout a reason as the cause of the a<'tion. this would secun• a necessary 
proper! y, so sl rongly dcsidcrated by all lhc llworisls. 
The most promisin� candidate for a reason as the cause is a particular want 
or desire Lhal one has in co njunction with a related belief about how to satisfy 
it. In his es...a}, "Actions. Causes, and Heasons," Davidson says that alt hough a 
desire or a belief is disposi tion al, the u11slaugh I of a desire or a belief ill not. 1 he 
onslaught is a mental e\·ent: therefore 1t can serve as an identifiable anle<.•edenl 
event of an al'lion. "A desire to hurl \our fct>ling:s may spring up al the moment 
you anger me; I may start wanting to cat a melon just when I see one; and 
beliefs may begin al the moment we notice, perceive, learn, or remember 
something" (op cit.. p. 7 I).  Thest' onslaughts of desires and belief�, like 
Meldcn's drher who notices (or thinks he notices) his turn coming up, arc men· 
lat events-awarenesses- not something we are aware of; these, then, arc the 
reasons that cause the rcspecth·e actions of hurting your feelings, ealing a molon, 
or signal ing a Lurn. 
Is, for example, lhe onslaught of my desire to hurl your feelings al the mo­
ment ) ou anger me the primary reason that causes my hurling you'? If 1 t is, it 
must include a relatl'd belief: so let that bt• my belief thal I can hurt you b)' 
insulting you. �ow the mental state is the specific desire and related belief 
about hO\\ to salisfy it. This state is my awareness and il causes m} in�ulting 
you. "Why did you insult me"? asked by �ou, is answered by me: "Bet-a use you 
hurt my f�lmgs:" which implies a pro altitude I ha\'e about relaliatio1 le)\\ ard 
people who hurl my feelings and a bC'licf about how to retaliate in this kind of 
situation: the primary reason. 
Well, now ,  the primary reason of my action of insulting you is my pro alti· 
tude toward retaliation and my belief that insulting you will satisfy this pro 
attitude. On Davidson's 'iew, this has to be the cause of the action. But in his 
example, al is not: Lhe cause of m> desire to hurt )-OU is )Our angeri ng m<•. Your 
aclion o f  angering me is the cause of my desire Lo hurl. you and or m) tclion of 
insulting you. Yet for Davidson, ) our action cannot be the cauw of ·11ine be· 
cause all that can be the cause of mine is m!t pro attitude and related belief 
toward actions like yours. 
Thus, what Da\ldson shows b) his appeal lo the onslaught of a pJrlicu lar 
desire is that it is caused by somethmg else (e.g., your angering me) and. in turn, 
is a cause of my aclion (e.g .. insulti n� you). He does not show that tn) particular 
pro attitudf;) toward, for example, rctalialion, and my particular related bt'lief, 
for example, that insulting you is one way to rntaliate-the primary reason-is 
lhe cause of my action of insulting you. The primary cause of my action is 
your action; thC' primary reason o f  m) action is my attitude toward being n nger­
ed and retalintion. or course, to repeal whal I said before, in explainmg m) 
insulting )OU, among the reasons in the explanation ma) be statements about 
some of the causes, for example. "You insulted me;" "I wanted lo retaliate," 
etc; bul the explanation contains no statement about my pro attitude and re-
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laled belief as a cause, only as a reason. 
Davidson, then, does not show Lhat reason as cause is a necessary constit.uent 
or all human actions. Nor does he show that specific desires or lheir onslaughts 
are the causes of action. All he shows is thal these onslaughts, along with olher 
menlal events, are among the causes of action and, as such, can enter into the 
explanalions of actions as reasons. This reminder is important to the philosophy 
of mind in its assemblage of mental events. Its conlribulion lo the philosophy of 
action, however, is limited Lo the range of causes, not extended to reasons as 
causes. 
J\re the pro attitudes and related beliefs given as reasons for actions reducible 
to particular desires and related beliefs? If they are, lher\ the reason for an action 
is lhe particular desire and related belief that cause the action. Such is lhe heroic 
line taken by some philosophers, most recently by Alvin Goldman in A Theory 
of Iluma11 i'lclion (1970).10 Like Davidson, Goldman construes reason-expla­
nation as a species of causal explanalion. 'l'o explain why A did x, to give the 
reason for A's action, is to imply thal A had the indicated particular want and 
belief and that his having this want and belief caused his action. Goldman ties 
reasons to action-plans and adds a provocative logical entailment between want 
and action. However, or immediate concern here is his O\'erriding thesis that all 
the reasons cited in the explanation of actions-all our goals, purt)oses, attilu des, 
conventions, and convictions that we specify in answering why we do or did 
what we do or did-are among the causes of our actions. Our reasons for action 
are the st.anding wants that become the occurrent wants which cause the action. 
These occurrenL wants, he says. are mental events or mental processes: goings. 
on in consciousness. Each or us has prh ileged access to his wants and can know. 
though not with the certainty of one's own, the wants of others. I low, then, 
does one acquire the concept of an occurrent want? Goldman faces this crucial 
question. His answer is that each of us learns the first person use in two ways: 
(1) "The child notices lhe occasions in which adults ascribe ( certain 1 wants Lo 
him [e.g., wan ling to play with the ball ] and correlates their words with the 
slate he is in. Ile comes to recognize that when he is attracted to playing with 
the ball . . . •  then the adu Its say he 'wants' to play with the ball . . . .  Thus. he 
learns Lo say of himself thal he wants lhe ball . . .  in the right circumstances" 
(p. 121; ilalics in original). (2) The child, having learned lo name objects, when 
he is attracted to the ball and wanting to reach it, says "ball." "Gradually he 
acquires the idea of making a request . . .  The word 'want' is taught to him (or 
simply learned by him) as part of request behavior. Thus, he learns to say 'l want 
the ball' . . . •  instead of simply 'ball' . . .  Although he ha.'i these mental e\•ents. 
he has not yet reflected upon his consciousness lo notice lhem as mental evenls. 
Later, however, he comes to recogn ize that his reaching for the ball, or his 
asking someone to give him the ball, results from a fell al lraclion for the ball. 
Al this stage he recognizes wanting as a mental event, that Lends to cause his 
behavior" (ibid; italics in original). The child's learning of the third person use 
parallels his learning of the first person use. Jn either case, when the child Cully 
understands the term, Goldman concludes, " . . .  'want' is seen lo apply in the 
same sense both to himself and to others-viz., to a mental event which tends to 
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lead to a<'tion" (ibid. ). 
This reading o[ the concept of want, on which Goldman resls his lheory of 
human action, including the doctrine thal lhe reasons for action are Lhe desires 
lhal cause action, entails the indefensible thesis that since the word 'wha�· names 
an inner, private event or proce�which we are brought to recognize by teach­
ing and learning how to use 'want' i n  external circumstances bul where this 
teaching and learning are only preparatory lo grasping the meaning of the word­
t.he sole necessary and sufficient criterion for the understanding (nol the 
teaching and learning) of the concept of want is Lhe innately private ex;>erience 
of wanUng. Whatever can be sajd about such a n  experience, il  cannot be said or 
it that il is a criterion, sole or not, necessary, sufficient, or nol, because i� cannot 
function as a criterion at all. Thus, it seems lo me that Goldman's allempt to 
affirm reason as cause a necessary property of all human aclions, depe:iding as 
iL does on his doctrine or wants as causes of act.ion which doctrine m turn rests 
entirely upon his misreading of the concept or want as criterionless, does not 
succeed either. 
None of our theories establishes a necessary properly of human actions. 
'l'his leaves open the possi bility that other theories may succeed where these fail. 
To foreclose on this possibility and indirectly Lo rationalize my omissjon of 
other theories, past and present, I want now lo argue Lhal such a pursuit is nol 
feasible. I do not mean lo suggest that il is self-contradictory; rather that the 
attempt to do so is logically misbegotten in th.a� it lays down ncccssar) criLeria 
for a concept whose use and conditions of use preclude such criteria. 
In his essay, "Action,'' Melden writes: 
It is the enormou5 \'ariety of cases that defeats any allempt to pro\'ide a 
summary account of the nature of action in bodily and psychological factors. 
Some of my actions are deliberate. I weigh .alternatives and choose. Some of 
my actions are done with a motive but without deliberation and choice . . .  
Some things 1 do without any moti\'e . . .  Some things I do simply because l 
want lo, or on the spur o f  the moment, and for no reason al all. If we con­
sider the mental processes attending the relevant bodily movemenl.s, we find 
an enormous variation i n  what transpires. The cases range from those in 
which nothing that seems at all relevant happens except the occurrence of the 
bodily movement-one responds Lo lhe silualion in which one finds oneself 
almost automatically, guided as it were by habit. and the wlhole accumulation 
of past experience-to the cases in which force of mind, greaL effort, or 
internal struggles are i nvolved as habiL is resisted or passions and temptations 
conquered . . . .  The characteristic philosophic vice of generalizing from 
special cases is involved in the familiar summary explanation of the concept 
of action in terms of various psychological factors or processes (op. cit., 
p. 526). 
Melden Limits his criticism of theories of action to the causal ones because he 
wishes to counter them with his own, non-causal, conventional theory. But the 
reason he gives for the defeat of the causal theories-the vast variety of cases of 
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human action-defeats all theories: all statements o f  Lhe neces.sary and sufficient 
properties o f  human action and. as important, all claims about their neces.c;ary 
properties. 
That there is this \'ast variety of cases of human action, ranging from habitual 
behavior to the deliberation, decision, and execution involved in a complicated 
plan of aclion, is indisputable. H is this \'ariety, encompassing actions with or 
without desires, intentions, motives, causes, mental events, purposes, goals, 
reasons, and even with or without any ordinary acts or doings, as in certain in­
aclions which we and the law regard as actions, that an elucidation of the con­
cept or a human action must hold constant. 
Thus, it is no good starling with a class of core cases, for example, C. Taylor's 
"strong" cases of intentional behavior, working out. a theory of these, and th.en 
situating the others on the margins (his "loose" cases), or throwing them out of 
the class altogether. For a marginzl case o f  one theorist becomes a core case for 
another (e.g., wiggling onC<'s finger for no reason at all) or a non-action for one 
theorist becomes a core case for another Lheorisl (e.g., killing a man unintenlion­
ally). 
Instead of talking of core or strong cases of human action, we must talk of 
undeniable or clear cases. If we do not, we foreclose on the vast variety of cases 
which it is the philosopher's assigned and accepted task to illuminate. Of course 
there are enormous and notorious difficulties surrounding the criteria of the 
identity and individuation of an action; but it docs not seem to me that we can­
not talk ol' clear cases of human action until we can solve these difficulties. 
Qui le lhe contrary: we cannot even begin to formulate the criteria of an action 
unless we have some clear cases before us. Indeed, it is because of the clarity of 
the cases of flipping the switch, turning on the light, illuminating the room, and 
alerting the prowler, that philosophers such as Davidson, Anscombe, Goldman, 
and others, can raise questions aboul the identity and indi\liduation of these 
actions: whether they are the same action with different descriptions of it or 
whether they are different actions with correspond ingly different descriptions? 
Whatever the correct answers to these questions are and however tied these 
answers are Lo the quest for necessary properties of human actions, philosophers 
can concentrate on this search without first settling the problems o f  identity and 
individuation since answers lo these problems derive from what theorists take to 
be the necessary (or necessary and sufficient) properties of human action or, if 
there are no such properties, can be resolved in other ways. 
Now, if we keep before us as many of the clear, undeniable cases of human 
action as we can, it does look as if their \'asl variety does defeat any putatively 
neressary property. What, one must ask, is the common denominator of the 
following haphazard list of actions, none o f  which can be repudiated without 
arbitraril) limiting the range of use of the concept of human action? Mo\1ing 
one's finger for no reason al all; putting on lhe left shoe before the ril{hl: 
driving to work; raising one's arm lo signal; polluting the atmosphere by drhing; 
forgetting Lo clear the iced walk; refusing to vote on polling day; stopping at the 
store for some tobacco; convening an imporlanl meeting; read ing a report with 
the assigned task of making a recommendation regarding future action, with the 
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inlention of sorting ouL all the issues, painful or nol, wilh the motive of en­
hancing the welfare of the institution, and with the goal of making a better 
university; getting married; filing for a divorce ; falling in love; resigning one's 
job; writing a letter of resignation; quitting one's job; turning on the wrong tap; 
scalding Watkins; killing a man unintentionall}', impulsively ,  b} accident, 
mistaken ly, or inadvertently; stalking a bird; hunting a lion; shooting a rabbit; 
missing the target; looking for a needle in a haystack; finding a needle in a 
haystack with or without looking for it; shaking hands; brushing elbows; 
greeting one's friend; mJrdering someone, etc .. etc .. etc. 
The theorists. of course, do not accept all of these as cases of action; nor do 
they offer the same reasons for the ones they agree are actions. E\'en so, it re­
mains a fact that each of these examples is a legilimate member of the class of 
human actions for one of our theorists or anoth(?r. The concept of human action 
accommodates all these cases, in spite of aJI the disagreements O\'er whether tlhey 
are cases or not. 
If we turn from this vast variety of cases to those disagreements among Lhe 
theorists about what counts as an action-their action-giving-reasons-we find the 
clue to the concept of human action as well as to the im]possibility of any 
necessary criterion of thaL concept. For it is in their disagreements about why x 
is an action or whether x is an act ion that the logic of the criteria of the concept 
can be discerned. Whal is at issue in these disagreements is not the application of 
agreed-upon criteria but a debate over the criteria themselves. 
The concept of a human aclion, e\•en as it is employed by the theorisl.s. has 
many criteria, all manifested in the diverse properties of the vast. variety of 
cases of human action. None of these criteria covers all the cases; each is 
applicable only to some of the cases. The theorist-in his quest for a common 
property-opts for al least one among all the extant criteria as a necessary 
criterion; which then serves as his main action-giving-reason in answering why or 
whether x is an action. Jn effect, he proffers a necessary criterion of a concept 
whose use and conditions of use, as these cond itions are embodied in their and 
our collective talk about Lhe vast variety o f  cases, reveal that the concept has no 
such criterion. To persist that it. does have a necessary criterion is to violate the 
logic of a concept whicn can perform il.s assigned role only under lhe second­
order condition that it is governed by a multi pie, di verse set of first-order criteria, 
some of which are sufCicient, bul none of which is necessary. 
Whal sort of concept, then , is the concept of a human action? ll  illuminates 
nothing lo characterize or castigate it as ambiguous, vague, fishy, purely 
stipulative, or even dummy. For as it is applied to the vast variety of cases of 
human action, it is predominately none of these. Rather, as I have tried to 
show-mainly by pilling the theorists against each other-it Is open in the pre­
cise sense of having sufficient but no necessary criteria. If this is correct, the 
concept of a human action is not closed, defeasible, essentially disputable. or a 
family resemblance concept. Moreover, the sufficient criteria of Lhe concepL of a 
human action are coextensive with the good reasons-the action-giving-reasons­
for something being a human action. Because these action-giving-reasons differ 
from those good reasons that are coextensive with definilive criteria, necessary 
236 37
Weitz: The Concept of Human Action
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1972
MORRIS WE ITZ 
criteria, disjunctive sets of non-necessary. non-sufficient criteria, the concept of 
action is not closed, like thaL of triangle; or open in Hart's sense o f  necessary 
bul no sufficient criteria, like thal <>f contract; or open in Hampshire's sense of 
no undebatable criterion. like t.hat of moral or tragic (what. I call "perennially 
debatab le"); or open in Wittgenstei n's sense o f  no necessary. no sufficient. but 
some unrejectable criteria, like that of game or drama (what I call "perennially 
flexible"). Its opennes.c; of suffichmt but no necessary criteria can be assimilated 
to none or these. However, although it cannot be modeled on any of the above 
concepts, it may nevertheless ser"e as a model for our philosophical elucidation 
o[ other concepts, especially in psychology, where the quest. for the common 
properties of the various bits of human behavior continues unabated and 
unchallenged. 
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